Doubling up the Horses in Midstream: Enhancing U.S. Patent Dispute Resolution by the PTO\u27s Adoption of the JPO\u27s Hantei Request System by Cheng, Gino
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 4
2008
Doubling up the Horses in Midstream: Enhancing
U.S. Patent Dispute Resolution by the PTO's
Adoption of the JPO's Hantei Request System
Gino Cheng
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Gino Cheng, Doubling up the Horses in Midstream: Enhancing U.S. Patent Dispute Resolution by the PTO's Adoption of the JPO's Hantei
Request System, 24 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 375 (2007).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol24/iss2/4
COMMENTS
Doubling Up the Horses in Midstream: Enhancing U.S.
Patent Dispute Resolution by the PTO's Adoption of the
JPO's Hantei Request System*
Gino Chengt
Abstract
For entities seeking to preempt or defend against adverse claims
of infringement, navigating the present U.S. patent dispute resolution
system is a thorny path. Judicial standing requirements hinder a
potential defendant from fully assessing its risks before making and
placing in jeopardy certain investments or assuming negotiation
costs, thereby increasing its accountability, the financial stakes, and
the probability of retaliation. While the standing doctrine has become
more favorable to would-be licensees over time, a readily accessible
opining mechanism for infringement would usher in still more
benefits, including those unachievable through either litigation or
conventional forms of alternative dispute resolution. Although the
United States Patent and Trademark Office currently lacks
Congressional authorization, the agency, due to its familiarity with
patent claims and technical expertise, would be a prime candidate for
administering such an advisory determination procedure, comparable
to the Hantei Request System offered by the Japanese Patent Office.
Moreover, the domestic implementation of this system by the PTO will
not suffer the same disadvantages endemic to Japan's legal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Japan Patent Office ("JPO") issues advisory opinions
through its Hanteit Request System to anyone who seeks to know in
advance or post facto whether a business practice infringes a patent or
if a patent anticipates another.: Though non-binding,3 it is an official
opinion that could carry great weight in negotiations, especially if
parties are receptive to deferring to the expertise of administrative
officials. 4 It is available for a nominal fee 5 and is usually issued very
quickly.6 This provides an efficacious route through which another
party can be brought to negotiate before resorting to more time-
consuming or expensive means.7
An equivalent to the Hantei Request is not offered by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). The closest U.S.
equivalent to this practice is obtaining a diligence opinion from one's
counsel,8  which often costs more than $30,0009 and enjoys
questionable objectivity.' 0 A more drastic measure would be to seek a
1. ("Hantet") means "determination." (author's trans.).
2. See JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (JPO) HANTEI, GUIDELINES FOR EASY HANTEI DEMAND
FILING, § l(l) (1998), http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki e/t tokkyoe/hantei.htm [hereinafter
GUIDELINES]. In the case of a trademark, the JPO will issue an advisory opinion regarding
whether a mark used during the course of business infringes another's. See id.
3. Id. ("Hantei results have no binding legal affects on defendants or third parties .....
4. See id. ("[S]ince a Hantei is an official opinion of the JPO, the Office that granted the
right in question, regarding the technical scope of the patented invention it is equivalent to an
expert opinion, is sufficiently respected in society and is an authoritative opinion.").
5. The cost is 40,000 Japanese yen, which is less than $400. Id. § l(2)(B)(b).
6. See id. at § l(2)(B)(c) (noting that the Hantei system renders results "as soon as three
months from filing of the demand for Hanter').
7. See JOSEPH W.S. DAVIS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN 169-70 (1996) (noting that
the typical request fee for arbitration is $5,000, and the hearing fee is $300 per session, to be
divided equally between the parties).
8. See John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation:
Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 155 (2000) ("The [Hantei] opinion is
treated as 'similar to an expert opinion' .... ). Reexamination of an issued patent is another
procedure offered by the PTO, but it seeks to invalidate the patent as opposed to determine non-
infringement. See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2 MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2209 (8th ed., rev. 5, 2006) [hereinafter MPEP]; 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-
05, 311, 314-15, 318 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006). To accomplish the latter, one must rely on either
a counsel's opinion or a federal court's declaratory judgment.
9. See Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/menell.pdf ("Opinion letters can cost in excess of $40,000 per
patent asserted.").
10. As a preliminary matter, "the importance of the opinion of counsel 'does not depend
on its legal correctness."' Steelcase Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (W.D. Mich.
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declaratory judgment of non-infringement, but at that point one is
already participating in litigation. 1 The PTO's adoption of something
akin to the Hantei Request procedure would greatly expedite the
resolution of patent disputes in the U.S., offering potential litigants a
cheap and time-saving way of sidestepping unpredictable District
Court rulings and the high risk of appellate reversals. The explication
of any vehicle of reform that could expedite dispute resolution in a
field where litigation is growing increasingly common despite its
costs would help many businesses and inventors.
This comment proposes the creation of a pilot program by the
PTO, adopting an advisory mechanism similar to the Hantei Request
System of the JPO. This comment also advocates strong deference
towards such advisory determinations on infringement, by District
Courts in adjudicating patent cases that eluded settlement. This
comment will examine the predicted benefits and feasibility of
adopting such a review system in the U.S. It will also highlight
potential pitfalls to be avoided, and disadvantages that should be
weighed against the expected gains.
Commentators have not yet addressed importation of Japanese
administrative patent practices and application towards alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR"). Basic issues have been commented on
1997) (quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Moreover,
the diligence opinion, if the litigant chooses to produce one, is most likely to be favorable to his
position of non-infringement, invalidity, or non-enforceability. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC,
497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Typically, counsel's opinion concludes that the patent is
invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed."). Otherwise, because there is no adverse inference
for not producing such an opinion, the litigant would probably never produce an unfavorable
opinion. See id. at 1370 ("[A]n accused infringer's failure to obtain legal advice does not give
rise to an adverse inference with respect to willfulness.") (citing Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
11. One other option would be to seek a license from the patentee and potential plaintiff.
However, this additional cost poses a barrier to entry that might prohibit the would-be licensee
from engaging in the arguably infringing activity altogether, depending on the licensee's
financial situation. He may be able to recover this expenditure by paying the licensing fees
under protest while challenging the validity of the licensed patent. See MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (holding that the petitioner "was not required,
insofar as Article III is concerned, to break or terminate its.. license agreement before seeking a
declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed."). Given the unlikelihood of recovering attorney's fees, however, the prospective
licensee still stands to suffer some monetary loss, as well as time lost at trial. Moreover, while
the implication of Medlmmune is that the licensee would be able to bring suit against the
licensor, it is not completely clear that he can. See id. at 769-70, 776 (refusing to opine on
whether collateral estoppel still applies to non-repudiating licensees and prevents them from
bringing suit, despite the holding that licensees have standing to seek declaratory judgment). For
further discussion about licensing, please see infra note 143.
378 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
such as problems with either the Japanese or U.S. patent systems, 12 or
importing Japanese administrative practices with a focus on
litigation.13 In the context of litigation, scholars and reformists have
neither analyzed the viability of adopting the Hantei Request System
in the U.S., 14 nor looked beyond using the administrative organ of the
PTO as a shortcut or judicial stepladder 15 for determining technical
questions. 6 But most of all, many of the articles were written before
the panoply of administrative and legislative changes were put into
effect in Japan, altering the landscape of litigating patent disputes and
the dynamics of handling them. 
17
12. Professor Takenaka's article mentions that the Hantei Request System has been
"enhanced" recently, but she steers her discussion towards patent infringement and damages.
See Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Infringement Damages in Japan and the United States: Will
Increased Patent Infringement Damage Awards Revive the Japanese Economy?, 2 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 309, 354-55 (2000).
13. Professor Duffy takes brief notice of Hantei and its availability, but instead of delving
extensively into the new procedure, chooses instead to defer its discussion until its popularity
becomes more pronounced. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 155-56.
14. The Justice System Reform Council recommends that Hantei should be "expanded
and vitalized, and coordination between litigation and ADR should be reinforced" in Japan, but
does not make any recommendations regarding the exportation of the practice to other countries.
The Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council:
For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119, 143 (2001).
15. Motsenbocker's comment focuses on the doctrine of equivalents, the inefficiencies of
judicial review of technical matters, and domestic bias against foreign litigants. See generally
Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposed Changes to Japanese and United States Patent Law
Enforcement Systems, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 389 (1995). He also suggests that U.S. courts
require reexamination, rather than delving into Hantei. See id. at 426-27.
16. There is great potential of its domestic application as to buttressing or prefacing (but
not usurping) the jealously guarded function of making an infringement determination.
17. Such revolutionary changes in Japan include: the 1996 amendment to the Code of
Civil Procedure; the 1998, 2003, and 2004 amendments to the Patent Law; the recognition of the
doctrine of equivalents in 1998, see Shusaku Yamamoto & John A. Tessensohn, Broadly,
Correctly and Openly - Japanese Patent Litigation as a Weapon for the 21st Century, I.P.
JAPAN (COMMEMORATIVE ISSUE) 242, 261 (1999); and the exercise of judicial authority to
invalidate a JPO-issued patent in 2000 by the highest court in their land. See "Tokkyo no
Youkousei" no Handan ni oite Chizai Kousai ga Hatasu Yakuwari to wa [Regarding the
Decision about the "Patentability of Patents, " the Role that the High Court of Intellectual
Property Plays: Interview with the Chief of the High Court for Intellectual Property], CHIZAI
AWARENESS [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AWARENESS] Apr. 13, 2006,
http://chizai.nikkeibp.co.jp/chizai/etc/shinohara200604l3.html
In the contentious litigation (the Kilby case) between Fujitsu and America's
Texas Instruments (TI), in regards to infringement and the right to recover
damages, in the year 2000, the highest court handed down the ruling that, "In
light of the precipitously high likelihood of Ti's patent being invalidated, their
use of the patent as a basis of action against a third party would be an egregious
misuse and as such unforgivable," agreeing with the invalidity defense.
According to the 2004 Patent Reform's § 104(3), "In litigation involving patent
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This comment presents a fresh look at the justifications and
feasibility of importing the Hantei Request procedure. Part I provides
a brief overview of relevant U.S. patent law to provide a standard for
comparison. Part III provides background information about the
Japanese counterpart to U.S. patent litigation and its operations. Part
IV explores the viability of ADR methods in both countries in
managing patent disputes, with a focus on arbitration. Part V
identifies the shortcomings of U.S. patent practice in both litigation
and ADR. Part VI then addresses a specific weakness in U.S patent
practice and considers the substantive benefits of domestically
implementing a Hantei Request System as a patch. Part VII analyzes
the institutional differences that may account for any suboptimal
operation of the Hantei Request System in Japan, and speculates why
the U.S. will not suffer the same endemic disadvantages. Part VII also
speaks to constitutional ramifications and concerns which must be
factored into the practicability of the System's adoption in the U.S.
In a post-industrial society where patent rights are regarded as
highly-valued assets and where a single transactional misstep may
have significant economic consequences, if the legal system is not
equipped with a means to clearly, quickly, and cheaply delineate the
relationships and obligations of competing market players, then those
entities will suffer the frustration of not being able to arrive at a
timely answer, and assume the perils of miscalculating obligations
arising under the patent laws. Importing the Hantei Request procedure
to the U.S. can facilitate the demarcation between the livelihood and
liability of a wary business. It can also supply private actors with an
additional bargaining tool. To the extent feasible, it should be
adopted.
rights and encroachment upon exclusive use rights, when it is recognized that a
patent ought to be invalidated according to an invalidation determination, the
patent holder or exclusive licensee cannot enforce that right against opponents"
(item 1), and "pursuant to the previous section's rule, when it is recognized that a
patent is being asserted for the purpose of delaying the trial inappropriately,
whether offensively or defensively, the courts may, either by party's petition or
sua sponte, hand down a rejection or dismissal of the assertion" (item 2) are
effected.
(author's trans.).
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II. THE PTO AND THE U.S. TRIAL SYSTEM
A. Allocation of Power and Delegation of Duties and Services
If patent litigation were a Greek tragedy, Act One would open
with Estragon, an owner of a valid U.S. patent, who is alleging in a
U.S. District Court that Vladimir has infringed on one or more of his
patent claims. The accused will plead non-infringement and, more
importantly, invalidity of the plaintiffs patent, which turns the tables
on Estragon. If the patent he acquired at the end of the patent
prosecution process is insufficiently robust, then Estragon might find
himself exiting the courtroom with an invalidated patent instead of
monetary and injunctive relief. Had the setting for this scene been the
steps of any Japanese district courthouse prior to 2004,18 this reversal
of fortune would have been impossible.
The U.S. District Courts have the prerogative not only to
determine the infringement19 of PTO-issued patents, but their validity
as well. 20 By contrast, the Japanese district courts, until recently, did
not have dual authority to invalidate and construe patent claims. 2' As
such, U.S. District Courts' authority overlaps with, and in some ways
overshadows, the PTO's authority to invalidate U.S. patents.22
18. See TOKKYO HO [PATENT LAW], No. 220 of 1999, art. 104-3 (authorizing courts to
invalidate patents).
19. To be more precise, the court determines the scope of the patent's claims, and the jury
enters the verdict on whether the alleged infringement occurred. See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996).
20. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .. "); 35
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006) (providing the requirements for patent
validity); Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000)) ("In a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States ... may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration .... ).
21. See Tokkyo no Youkousei, supra note 17 (highlighting the inability of the courts to
directly invalidate a patent in the context of a discussion about the impact of the Fujitsu and
Texas Instrument ("TI") case in 2000 on the state of Japanese patent law) (author's trans.). Prior
to this, invalidation proceedings had to be initiated by a "separate request to the JPO."
Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 255.
22. Through reexamination, PTO examiners may end up rejecting certain claims in a
previously issued patent, canceling any claims found to be unpatentable. See 2 MPEP, supra
note 8, § 2287(11) ("There will be instances where all claims in the reexamination proceeding
are to be canceled .... "). If no claims survive the reexamination, the patent is in effect
invalidated. Moreover, a concurrent or previous court finding of invalidity has binding effect on
the PTO's own determination, eclipsing the latter's authority. Id. at § 2286(11) ("A final holding
of claim invalidity... is controlling on the Office."). However, the converse is not true. A final
court decision of claim validity does not control the same inquiry in reexamination. Id. In both
countries, though, the patent offices retain the exclusive authority over issuing patents.
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However, as convenient as it seems for the courts to wield the scythe
of invalidation above patent owners who have limited the resources
available to their patent prosecutors or above self-filing inventors
responsible for obtaining questionable patents, this plenipotentiary
procedure is not without its share of costs and burdens.23
A major downside of attempting to enforce U.S. patent rights is
that a court may feel compelled to consider the affirmative defense of
patent invalidity whenever raised by a defendant prior to addressing
the issue of infringement.2 4  The ubiquitous employment of this
affirmative defense as a part of a responsive pleading's boilerplate has
delayed the adjudicative process. 25 Nor would it be efficient for a
court to risk tackling the issue of infringement before concluding the
invalidity phase of the trial. If the patent is subsequently found
invalid, the judicial resources expended during the infringement phase
will have been wasted.
So far, only the difference between the U.S. and Japanese trial
systems has been highlighted. However, there are also many
differences in the administrative services offered by the PTO and the
JPO. For instance, the PTO procedure for reexamination 26 has no
23. In the 396 patent decisions that LEXIS reported the Federal Circuit as having filed
between January 1, 1998 and April 30, 2000 and for which written opinions were authored, 69
of them (17%) involved claims of invalidity only. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ., 1075, 1138 (2001). If
such a large percentage is litigated up to the appellate level based on the issue of invalidity
alone, an even greater number would have to have been brought in the District Courts
(excluding those appealed from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences) on at least that
issue. A framework in which courts have jurisdiction over patent invalidity will impose a variety
of economic, temporal, and procedural burdens on litigants who are solely interested in validity,
and likely on litigants interested not only in validity as well. Some of these costs will be
examined in Part V(B), infra.
24. To reverse the sequence and evaluate the case on the merits first could amount to a
waste of judicial resources. See Chu, supra note 23, at 1140-4 1.
25. So habitual has the practice become that an advocate who does not raise this defense
is likely to face a malpractice suit if his client is found to have infringed. See A. Samuel Oddi,
Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 27 (2004):
In Sybron, the client retained the firm for representation in a dispute over a
"license" agreement covering a patent. In its answer the firm asserted a number
of affirmative defenses, including the invalidity of the patent .... The firm then
moved for summary judgment, but did not mention any of the affirmative
defenses in the motion. The court denied the motion and held that the client had
waived its affirmative defenses .... The client then brought a malpractice action
against the firm seeking to recover the damages paid, the further payment, and
the attorney's fees it had paid.
(citations omitted).
26. This post-issuance invalidity determination originally was only issued ex parte, but
now can be issued ex parte or inter partes pursuant to the 1999 amendments to the
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Japanese counterpart.27 Reexamining a patent, however, may be an
unattractive option for the initiator. Because of a variety of
drawbacks, including fees, business concerns, and other practical
disincentives, it is rarely used by third parties to invalidate patents.28
Thus, a disinterested member of the public has little incentive to seek
reexamination of a questionable patent.2 9
There is potentially an even greater deterrent for interested third
parties to seek reexamination. An interested third party is often
interested because he is familiar with the prior art from his own
inventive or commercial activities. Any prior art, while possessing
offensive potential, could very well predate and anticipate his
conceived inventions as well. 30 There is thus a disincentive for him to
request reexamination using that prior art as a basis. Such a third
party would prefer to sit on his finding rather than disclose it.31
reexamination provisions. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 151-52
(3d ed. 2004). See generally 2 MPEP, supra note 8, § 2209; 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-05, 311, 314-15,
318 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
27. The JPO's Hantei Request procedure, although a determination on infringement
rather than validity, is perhaps the closest analog.
28. See Dale L. Carlson & Robert A. Migliorini, Patent Reform at the Crossroads:
Experience in the Far East with Oppositions Suggests an Alternative Approach for the United
States, 7 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 261, 264 (2006) ("For a variety of reasons, these reexamination
systems have not been utilized to the extent hoped."). The authors explain that "the lack of
requester involvement and the inability of the requester to appeal either a denial of a
reexamination request or an adverse decision if reexamination is granted has resulted in ex parte
reexamination being an underutilized method for challenging patent validity." Id. at 268.
29. Ex parte reexamination costs $2,520 to initiate. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1) (2006). An
inter partes reexamination would cost $8,800 to initiate, plus hefty attorney's fees. 37 C.F.R. §
1.20(c)(2) (2006). See also 35 U.S.C. § 4 1(d) (2000) ("The Director shall establish fees for all
other processing, services, or materials relating to patents not specified in this section to recover
the estimated average cost to the Office of such processing, services. ... ). The entire
proceeding "can cost each side $10,000 to $100,000 .... " Steven J. Frank, Patent Reform
Cacophony, IEEE SPECTRUM ONLINE (Dec. 2005), http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/dec05/2349.
30. This comment assumes that it is highly unlikely for a person performing random
searches to make the connection that a particular piece of prior art will pose a challenge to the
patentability of a particular patent belonging to a stranger. As such, any high degree of
familiarity with another's patent would probably stem from its being a co-occupant of the
specific field of one's own invention. If that patent is something that anticipates the searcher's
invention, it is almost certain that he will be familiar with both inventions and keen enough to
realize when he has found prior art that will anticipate them both.
31. However, when he applies for his patent, he is still required to disclose this
potentially fatal knowledge, which may diminish his reservations about requesting
reexamination of another's current patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2006) ("Each individual
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good
faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability .... ").
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32Kamikaze behavior, in general, does not make good business sense,
especially if one treasures long term relationships.
Also, in regard to preserving longstanding business relationships,
even if both patents survive the ex parte reexamination proceeding
unscathed, the holder of the reexamined patent is not likely to harbor
any good will towards the requester, nor be as receptive to future
dealings. Despite the proceeding being ex parte, the "name of the
person who files the request will not be maintained in confidence. 33
The patent holder, having discovered the identity of the requester, will
likely retaliate where feasible, scrutinizing the requester's activities
for potential infringement and then commencing a suit accordingly. In
this respect, reexamination can be a serious liability, rather than a fail-
safe weapon for a potential infringer who wishes to stay under the
radar.
Finally, as a matter of practical litigation strategy, it may be ill-
advised to undertake the invalidation of another's patent through
reexamination. As Professor Carlson has criticized:
The initial ex parte opportunity has been limited in its success, and
it has not been widely utilized, partly because of the concern that
defendants do not want to use their so-called "silver bullet"; that is,
a piece of really good prior art. Why should they use that prior art
in an ex parte proceeding, where they will have a very limited
opportunity to participate in the proceeding and face the downside
risk of an enhanced patent? Why should a defendant give up its
silver bullet under those circumstances? 3
4
While the relatively new inter partes option for reexamination
proceedings 35 does ameliorate this worrisome incentive for a potential
litigant or requester to save his trump card, the option does not
address the likely self-destructive 36 domino effect of identifying
32. A word of Japanese origin, referring to an offensive aerial maneuver that results in
significant losses for both sides. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 925 (Elizabeth J.
Jewell & Frank Abate eds., 2001) (explaining the etymology and defining the adjectival form as
"of or relating to such an attack" or "potentially self destructive").
33. 2 MPEP, supra note 8, § 2212.
34. Dale L. Carlson & Jason Crain, Reexamination: A Viable Alternative to Patent
Litigation?, 3 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 2 (2000),
available at http://www.yjolt.org/old/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2. Accord
Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 424-26.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006); MPEP, supra note 8, § 2609.
36. If one was merely a licensee without a patent of one's own, it would not be self-
destructive to try to invalidate the licensor's patent. However, even if one is a licensee, if he
owns his own patent, finding anticipatory art may backfire, invalidating both parties' patents.
The self-destructiveness hinges on the ownership of one's own patent.
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anticipatory prior art. Like exparte reexamination, it thus falls prey to
the same concern raised earlier, that the trump card may thwart the
patentability of the cardholder's own invention as well.
Additional procedural restrictions plague the popularity of
reexamination. While the requirements upon the initiator are few,
37
the requirements prior to the initiation are plural and arguably more
38
cumbersome. Under the totality of the circumstances, it is no
surprise that reexamination is not often utilized.39
In Act Two of the tragedy of patent litigation, the defendant
Vladimir has been found guilty of infringement. He licks his wounds,
pays his debts, and returns to the drawing board. This time he fathoms
another great money-making design as a spin-off of his old one. His
problem is that Estragon or other potential plaintiffs may still have
live patent rights, and Vladimir is not sure how far around those
patents he has designed. Rather than continuing to invest in research
and development in order to reduce his invention to a practicable
model, he would like to know in advance whether his proposed
invention or activity will give rise to liability. 40 This time, Vladimir
arrives at the District Court before any would-be plaintiffs, hoping to
avail himself of a favorable declaratory judgment invalidating
Estragon's patent from Act One.
4 1
Unfortunately for Vladimir, his claim is most likely premature. If
he is not far enough along in the process of manufacturing, using, or
selling his new product 42 such that another infringement suit is
37. Any person may initiate the reexamination. See 2 MPEP, supra note 8, § 2212.
38. See generally 37 C.F.R. 1.510(b)(l)-(5) (2006); 2 MPEP, supra note 8, §§ 2216,
2609(C) (requestor must raise a "substantial new question" addressing the patentability of the
invention that was not covered during the original examination); 2 MPEP, supra note 8, §
2609(B) (the only admissible evidence for the proceeding are prior patents or printed
publications that raise 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103 based rejections); 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-07, 312(a)
(2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
39. The multifaceted drawbacks of reexamination shall be revisited in Part V(B), infra.
40. Assume that he wants to do this without the cost of seeking a license at an early stage.
For a discussion on the disincentives to taking on a license, even under protest, please refer to
note 143, infra.
41. See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(illustrating a case where plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment invalidating defendant's
patent). Depending on what the plaintiff is seeking, a declaratory judgment may be conceptually
a closer approximation to a Hantei Request than to reexamination. If non-infringement, then the
former. If invalidation, the latter.
42. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) ("A 'controversy'..
must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination.... It must be a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.") (citations omitted); Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736
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imminent,43 he may not have the requisite standing to seek declaratory
judgment.44 But even if Vladimir does have a justiciable case,45
bringing the action himself will not save him from a counterclaim of
infringement. Having been provoked and notified of possible
infringing activity, Estragon will most definitely respond by
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("First, the defendant's conduct must have created on the part of plaintiff a
reasonable apprehension that the defendant will initiate suit if the plaintiff continues the
allegedly infringing activity. Second, the plaintiff must actually have either produced the device
or have prepared to produce that device."). But compare MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 764, 774-75 n.l 1 (2007) (calling into question Aetna's construction of the Federal
Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit" test) with Sandisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.,
480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the Medlmmune Court had rejected Aetna
before holding that "where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified
ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it has the right
to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article IIl case or controversy will arise...
.") and id at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring) (noting that "under the court's standard virtually any
invitation to take a paid license relating to the prospective licensee's activities would give rise to
an Article III case or controversy .... "). While these recent cases usher in a new pro-plaintiff
method for evaluating Art. Ill jurisdiction, they are inapposite to Vladimir's circumstances.
Medlmmune dealt narrowly with the plight of a would-be plaintiff that had already entered into a
licensing agreement, and Sandisk with two parties whose licensing negotiations had stagnated
before any agreement could be reached. Neither case reaches the fact pattern where negotiations
have yet to be commenced on account of the patentee's ignorance of the potential infringer's
intentions. Even the Sandisk Court conceded:
In the context of conduct prior to the existence of a license, declaratory judgment
jurisdiction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a party learns of the
existence of a patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to pose a
risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by the patentee.
Id. at 1380-81. Accordingly, where Estragon does not even know what Vladimir is developing,
much less initiating negotiations, Vladimir cannot seek declaratory judgment against Estragon.
43. See Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato, 57 F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that
the mere notification by patentee that plaintiff's activity was covered by the patent and the
concurrent invitation to negotiate a license were insufficient to establish actual controversy). In
our hypothetical, Vladimir's pleading would be even more premature, given that Vladimir has
not yet done anything to draw Estragon's attention.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000) ("In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration...
."). See generally Thomas G. Pasternak & Karen J. Nelson, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction:
A Dance on the Razor's Edge, in CHISUM ET. AL., supra note 26, at 1060, 1062 (summarizing
the basic test for jurisdiction). But see Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774-75 n. 1l, 775, 777
(updating the traditional reasonable apprehension inquiry for justiciability under recent case law
developments, ultimately extending standing to non-repudiating licensees who were immune
from suits of infringement) and Sandisk, 480 F.3d at 1380-81 (without explicitly defining the
outer limits of standing for declaratory judgments, generally circumscribing it to situations
where there has been "some affirmative act by the patentee.").
45. See U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made ... to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another
State; between Citizens of different States..."; 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000); Arrowhead Indus.,
846 F.2d at 736. See also note 48, infra.
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counterclaiming that Vladimir infringed Estragon's patent, with the
result that they find themselves right back where they started, in Act
One.
Declaratory judgment as a solution suffers from a problem
similar to that of reexamination. There is a patent disincentive
stemming from accountability and retaliation. One of the many
concerns that militated against the use of reexamination was the lack
of anonymity. In this case, even supposing that all the judicial
standing requirements are met, the party seeking the declaratory
judgment would be opening himself up to immediate reprisal in the
form of an unwelcome counterclaim of infringement.46 Moreover,
rather than resorting to non-litigation means, he has invited litigation
and all of its accompanying detriments. Vladimir is in an intolerable
situation because he stands to later lose his investment in litigation47 if
he goes ahead and develops without any authoritative assurance that
he is not infringing.48 And yet, if he does not proceed, he will
completely forego capitalizing on his new idea.4 9
46. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1559 (noting that after Vas-Cath sued Mahurkar seeking a
declaratory judgment for non-infringement, Mahurkar counterclaimed, alleging infringement).
47. Cf Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 732
(2002) (discussing in the context of the doctrine of equivalents, "[i]f competitors cannot be
certain about a patent's extent, they may ... invest by mistake in competing products that the
patent secures. In addition the uncertainty may lead to wasteful litigation between competitors,
suits that a rule of literalism might avoid.").
48. Until he develops, he will not have standing to seek declaratory judgment. The way to
determine standing may be treacherous. There must be a "case of actual controversy." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a) (2000). See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Federal Circuit established a two-
prong test: first, the "reasonable apprehension" prong, and second, the "sufficient interest"
prong. See Arrowhead Indus., 846 F.2d at 736. This is a grave hurdle because it forces the
plaintiff to put his investment at risk in order to prove his sufficient interest, despite his
unwillingness to risk his investment before he has a declaration that he will not be infringing.
But see Sandisk, 480 F.3d at 1380-81 (noting that that "[t]he Supreme Court's opinion in
MedImmune represents a rejection of our reasonable apprehension of suit test" and suggesting
broadly that there may be jurisdiction for hearing declaratory judgments wherever "the patentee
takes a position that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of either pursuing
arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do."). Sandisk furthers
the recent doctrinal shift in standing in favor of the would-be licensee, without stumbling over
licensee estoppel issues. See id. Unlike Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 769-70, Sandisk avoids the
question of estoppel., because the parties never settled on a license.
Sandisk, then, merely moves up the time when a potential infringer could seek declaratory
relief from where a license has been negotiated to where potential parties to a future litigation
disagree on whether one's activity reads on the claims of another's patent. The societal benefit
from the Medimmune and Sandisk holdings derives from the ability to call upon a court to define
the legal relations of all interested parties earlier, because the earlier people clarify their
relationships and obligations, the less money needs to be needlessly expended on unnecessary
insurance and/or royalties. Arguably, however, Sandisk does not shift the time scale as far as it
could have. An opining mechanism like the Hantei Request System, with its still earlier
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B. Authority and Jurisdiction
Every U.S. District Court has original jurisdiction over patent-
related suits.50 Since 1982, appeals in such suits from the District
Courts have been streamlined and directed to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), which, "[e]xcept on those
occasions when the Supreme Court intervenes, ... is the ultimate
authority on interpreting patent laws, and all inferior courts, as well as
the Patent Office are bound by its interpretations.' On appeal or
interlocutory appeal by a defendant found in a U.S. District Court to
have committed infringement, the Federal Circuit will often be asked
to reconsider the claim construction rendered by the lower court.
52
Because Vladimir will not be able to easily attack the jury's factual
findings, he would do well to attempt to attack the judgment
indirectly by faulting the lower court's Markmnan hearing result. 53
III. THE JPO AND JAPAN'S TRIAL SYSTEM
A. Allocation of Power and Delegation of Duties and Services
Just like the PTO, the JPO cannot determine infringement with
binding force.54 As in the U.S., infringement is determined by the
availability, would further enhance Vladimir's ability to assess his risks in advance, without
simultaneously aggrandizing his accountability.
49. This translates into a social cost, because the world is deprived of the benefits of a
competing product line. Cf Festo, 535 U.S. at 732 ("If competitors cannot be certain about a
patent's extent, they may be deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits
.... "). This assumes that Vladimir is unable to obtain a license from Estragon or to afford
negotiating and paying for one. There is also the possibility that Vladimir is unwilling to subject
himself to paying a licensing fee under protest whose payment may very well turn out to be
unnecessary. Please see the last paragraph in Part V and note 143, infra, for a brief discussion
about the licensing option.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in
patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.").
51. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS 7 (1999).
52. In the 396 patent decisions that LEXIS reported the Federal Circuit as having filed
between January 1, 1998 and April 30, 2000 and for which written opinions were authored, 179
of them involved express claim construction review (45%). Chu, supra note 23, at 1146.
53. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 387-88, 391 (1996)
(claim construction is a question of law, and so de novo standard applies on appeal); Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that
issues regarding claim construction are purely questions of law despite there being mixed
questions of law and fact).
54. Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 406 ("The disjuncture in patent scope interpretation
between the Japanese courts and the JPO began in 1959, when the responsibility for deciding
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judiciary.55 From this point of commonality, however, the two
systems diverge.
In contrast to the dual authority of the federal courts over
infringement and invalidation, conducting invalidation proceedings
56
was, for the longest time, the JPO's prerogative alone. Before the year
2000, Japanese courts could not unilaterally invalidate patents called
into question before them. 57 Recent judicial pronouncements and
legislative amendments may have extended the courts' power to
invalidate, 58 although they generally still refrain from doing so,
sending the issue to the JPO instead.59
Analogously, even though it is now available, invalidity of the
plaintiffs patent is not freely wielded as a standard affirmative
defense.60  Moreover, there is still a disincentive for any purse-
conscious defendant to make such an invalidation appeal because it
"usually takes longer for the JPO to make a decision concerning an
issued patent and to appeal this decision than it does to hold an
infringement trial.'
patent infringement was transferred from the JPO to the courts."). See also id. at 407 ("[T]he
courts alone have the power to interpret these same patents during infringement litigation.").
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent ... cases.").
56. Invalidation of patents may be made on the various grounds set out in Patent Law
Article 49. TOKKYO HO [PATENT LAW], No. 220 of 1999, art. 49. Contra Yamamoto &
Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 255 ("[l]n Japan one must make a separate request to the JPO in
order to invalidate a patent.").
57. Compare Yoshinobu Someno & Keiko Someno, Patent Office and Court Procedures
in Japan, in PATENT AND KNoW-HOW LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 110, 121
(Teruo Doi & Warren L. Shattuck eds., 1977) ("[A] patent duly established by registration may
be subject to a trial [in the patent office] for invalidation (art. 123). This is the only way in
which the validity of a patent can be tested.") with "Tokkyo no Youkousei," supra note 17
[Regarding the damages suit between Fujitsu and the American company Texas
Instruments Inc., the Supreme Court laid down the ruling that, 'in light of the
precipitously high likelihood of TI's patent being invalidated, their use of the
patent as a basis of action against a third party would be an egregious misuse and
as such unforgivable.. ]
(author's trans.).
58. See TOKKYO HO [PATENT LAW], No. 220 of 1999, art. 104-3.
59. See Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 413 ("[A]n infringement court will usually
exercise its right to stay the infringement proceedings if the request for invalidation goes to the
appeals stage at the Tokyo High Court."). Contra Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at
255 ("A Japanese court is usually unwilling to halt or stay the proceedings of an infringement
case in order to wait for the Patent Office to decide on the question of invalidity .... ).
60. See Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 255 (noting that patent invalidity
cannot be an affirmative defense if the courts cannot rule on a patent's validity).
61. Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 411.
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The consequences of having such a system of mutually exclusive
domains over infringement and invalidity, either due to pre-2000
incapacity or post-2000 infrequency, are mixed. Facially, it appears
that Japanese courts can resolve issues of liability more quickly
without having to mull over the defendant's affirmative defense of
invalidity.62 However, the gains of potential celerity are diminished
by the costs imposed by judicial deferral and delay. The court might
grant a stay and refer the case to the JPO for an invalidation
determination, which is likely to end up taking more time.63
Another difference is the lack of reexamination for issued
patents. Instead, the public enjoyed a 5-year period to oppose the
validity of the newly issued patent under former Patent Law § 44.64
This opposition proceeding has no equivalent in U.S. patent law,
though a similar ritual in U.S. trademark law persists.65 Since 2004,
however, patent opposition in Japan has been streamlined with
invalidation proceedings.66
One final notable difference is the Hantei Request System,
whereby a requester can submit a demand to the JPO for a non-
binding determination of the technical scope of a patent.67 Three JPO
examiners are then assigned to render the opinion. 68 No U.S.
equivalent mechanism to seek an advisory opinion is offered by the
62. Takenaka, supra note 12, at 365.
63. See, e.g., Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 411.
64. Japan Patent Attorneys Association, 2003 Amendment to Japan Patent Law,
http://www.jpaa.or.jp/english/law/2003amendment.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007) ("The post-
grant opposition system is abolished, and the invalidation trial system is changed, effective from
January 1, 2004").
65. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2000) (procedures for opposing the registration of
trademarks).
66. See JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, TOKKYO FuYO GO NO ZYOUHYOU TEIKYOU SEIDO NI
TSUITE [ABOUT THE POST-PATENT ISSUANCE NOTICE-UPDATE SYSTEM] (2004), available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi/ttorikumi/20041020.htm (last visited May 4, 2007)
On account of the changes in the fifteenth year of the Heisei reign (2004), the
patent opposition system was discontinued, having been consolidated with the
patent invalidation system, whence it becomes a meaningful perspective to
propose a plan for more facilely correcting situations involving the issuance of
patents for inventions that cannot be patented.
In this endeavor, capitalizing on the opportunity provided by the Patent
Reform in the fifteenth year of the Heisci reign (2004), a post-issuance
information disclosure system was provided for in the patent law regulations
(Rule 13(3)).
(author's trans.).
67. TOKKYO HO [PATENT LAW], No. 220 of 1999, art. 71(1).
68. TOKKYO HO [PATENT LAW], No. 220 of 1999, art. 71(2).
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PTO or the federal courts, 69 despite the import of its substance and its
applicable utility to regulating business conduct and shaping licensing
negotiations. Both the information to be gleaned and the availing
mechanism are invaluable tools for those who wish to do business
while minimizing the risk of litigation.
70
The Hantei Request procedure is highly accessible. 71 Any
individual or company may request one, with no explicit provision
that excludes straw-men or intermediaries without "legal interest" in
the technical determination.72 These straw-men or intermediaries can
serve as buffers to insulate the interested party from potential reprisal.
The prerequisites are far less daunting than those required for judicial
standing73 or administrative reexamination.74 The ease of access to the
Hantei Request and the safeguarding of the requester's identity render
the Hantei Request less confrontational than its U.S. analogs - either
a request to the PTO for reexamination or the filing of suit for
declaratory judgment.
In addition, Hantei is a low-cost option. Currently the request fee
is less than $400.75 In contrast, the typical petition fee for arbitration
alone will cost the claimant $5,000,76 with the cost of each subsequent
hearing to be split between the parties.77 As compared to the costs of
litigation, the nominal Hantei Request fee is even more appreciably
dwarfed.78 Litigating and appealing can last for years, with a hefty
69. Marcus B. Finnegan et al., A Comparative Study of the Patent Laws of the United
States and Japan, in PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 3,
9 (Teruo Doi & Warren L. Shattuck eds., 1977).
70. See id. ("The interpretation of the scope of a patented invention is a critical facet of
determining patentability, validity, and infringement.").
71. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § l(2)(B)(b) (Hantei Request fee is 40,000 Japanese
yen).
72. See TOKKYO HO [PATENT LAW], No. 220 of 1999, art. 71; GUIDELINES, supra note 2,
at § I(3)(A) ("Parties requesting Hantei opinions are not required to have legal interest in the
Hantei result. However, from the perspective of the purpose of the system, the demander must
briefly explain their need to demand a Hantei opinion in the space for reason in the Hantei
demand form.").
73. See generally Pastemak & Nelson, supra note 44, at 1060-66.
74. See 2 MPEP, supra note 8, § 2212.
75. See GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 1(2)(B)(b).
76. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 169.
77. Id. at 170 ("The hearing fee for the use of the JCAA facilities is $300 per session.
$200 is charged if a hearing is canceled. The two parties split this expense.").
78. The costs of litigating a patent infringement suit through final judgment in a Japanese
District Court typically run from 15 million yen to 30 million yen (from over $130,000 to over
$260,000), assuming patent invalidity is not alleged. See, e.g., Country Reports: A Practical
Guide to Patent Litigation, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE GLOBAL MAGAZINE
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS,
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tally comprising attorneys' fees, court fees, expert witness fees,
staffing fees, recording fees, and lost employment time. In contrast to
the twenty or thirty months that a litigant may have to brave before
obtaining a ruling on infringement, the Hantei requester might only
need to wait a mere three months before hearing back from the jPO.
7 9
B. Authority and Jurisdiction
Prior to 1998, a suit for claim infringement 80 would be brought
in the district court of the local prefecture where the cause of action
arose. In 1998, the Code of Civil Procedure Law was amended to
allow for the change of venue to the Tokyo or Osaka District Courts
in patent cases.8 ' Cases originating from Nagoya or Sapporo, for
instance, can now be litigated in Tokyo.
The primary incentive for litigants in other prefectures to select
either Osaka or Tokyo as the forum is technical competence and
familiarity. The Osaka District Court has a special panel or "office" to
handle patents disputes, while the Tokyo sister court has three such
departments.82
The Tokyo and Osaka High Courts, to which 40% of the local
district court judgments are appealed,83 share jurisdiction over the
lower courts.84 They reverse 25% of the time.85 These two appellate
courts have greater discretion in making their findings than the U.S.
Federal Circuit, because they can hear issues of both fact and law de
http://managingip.com/CountryReport.aspx?Country[D=34 (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). In
contrast, the costs to bring the same suit in the U.S. may be much higher. IP WORLDWIDE, May
2002, at 43 ("The cost to bring a patent case [in the U.S.] ... ranges from $750,000 to $1
million for a simple dispute and from $4 million to $8 million for a modest one. Monster cases
can cost $10 million or more.").
79. See GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § l(2)(B)(c) (noting that the response time for a
Hantei request fee is "as soon as three months from filing of the demand for Hante').
80. We need not worry about adjudicated disputes concerning invalidation of patents up
through 1998, because the invalidation proceeding was under the exclusive authority of the JPO
until the year 2000. See "Tokkyo no Youkousei, "' supra note 17 (author's trans.).
81. See MINSOHO [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], No. 109 of 1996, art. 6.
82. Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 259-60.
83. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 361.
84. Osaka and Tokyo District Court decisions can be appealed to the Osaka and Tokyo
High Courts. Given the 1998 amendment to Japan's [Code of Civil Procedure], which gave the
Osaka and District Courts "exclusive and special jurisdiction for certain IP suits", the two High
Courts now hear a great percentage of patent appeals. Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17,
at 248-49 ("For cases coming within the jurisdiction of Tokyo, Nagoya, Sendai or Sapporo, the
plaintiff can file the suit in the Tokyo District Court; and for causes of action arising from
Hiroshima, Fukuoka or Takamatsu, one may file the suit in the Osaka District Court.").
85. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 68.
392 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
novo.86 Both High Courts are also equipped with a special intellectual
property ("IP") division to assist them in technical aspects of the
district court opinions.87 Moreover, the Tokyo High Court has the
exclusive authority to take appeals from decisions by the JPO's
internal Board of Appeals.88
Despite the coexistence of two appellate authorities, there
appears to be high uniformity in decision. While this phenomenon
could be ascribed to the expert technical departmental support
available to the Tokyo and Osaka District and High Courts, the lack
of forum shopping in general may also be a factor. Because juries are
not impaneled in Japan, awards are typically smaller89 and suffer less
risk of regional bias.90
Finally, the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority, but may
only hear questions of law from the High Courts on constitutional
issues.9' The Supreme Court retains a few judges who specialize in IP
matters to serve as research assistants to the Justices.
92
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATING PATENT DISPUTES
A. Arbitration in the U.S.
Even though there is currently no Hantei Request System
available in the U.S., Vladimir can avail himself of any one of a
number of respectable, authoritative bodies that offers arbitration and
specializes in IP disputes. One such body is the Intellectual Property
panel of the National Arbitration Forum.93 Another is the American
Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA"), which has
established an Alternate Dispute Resolution Neutral Registry.94
86. See id. at 68, 361.
87. See Takenaka, supra note 12, at 353-54.
88. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 67.
89. See id. at 125; Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 258.
90. The lack of a jury also renders it easier for either appellate court to justify rehearing
questions of fact on the grounds that the local district court judge was not as deserving of
deference as a reasonable jury might have been in fact-finding. Regardless, the peculiarities of
the Japanese legal system will be revisited in Part VII(A), infra.
91. See Someno & Someno, supra note 57, at 123.
92. Takenaka, supra note 12, at 353-54.
93. National Arbitration Forum, Intellectual Property, http://www.arb-
forum.com/main.aspx?itemlD=295&hideBar=False&navlD=71
&news=3 (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
94. American Intellectual Property Law Association, Alternative Dispute Resolution
Registry,
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Recently the American Bar Association's Section of Dispute
Resolution has formed a new Intellectual Property Committee to
expand the availability of ADR for IP disputes.95
The benefits of arbitration over litigation in intellectual property
matters are manifest and many: (1) Finality, if the parties desire it, in
the form of near non-appeal-ability of arbitral decisions; 96  (2)
confidentiality of business secrets; 97 (3) informality and procedural
flexibility;98 (4) amicability, 99 if the parties wish to preserve and
nurture a lasting and mutually beneficial relationship; (5) party-
tailored results to suit the needs of both sides, rather than a one-sided
remedial adjudication;'0 0 (6) simultaneous resolution of parallel
disputes' 0 ' with similarly situated adverse foreign parties; and (7) cost
savings from foregone litigation.
The Hantei Request procedure is even more attractive in view of
its functional importance.'0 2 It is common practice for entities doing
business in the U.S. to seek due diligence opinions from their
http://www.aipla.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ProfessionalDevelopment/AltemativeDispute
_Resolution_Registry/Default787.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
95. ABA, Section of Dispute Resolution: Intellectual Property,
http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR028500 (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
96. See Marion Lim, Note, ADR of Patent Disputes.: A Customized Prescription, Not an
Over-the-Counter Remedy, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 170-71 (2005); 35 U.S.C. §
294(c) (2000) ("An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to the
arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person.").
97. See NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, MEDIATING AND ARBITRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES 6 (2005). See also Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 245 (noting
that arbitration might be attractive to Japanese parties who would like to keep their cases heard
in confidence).
98. Compare NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 97, at 5-6 ("Primarily the
flexibility flows from the innovation and ingenuity of the parties in fashioning their arbitration
agreement. Because arbitration is a species of contract law, parties can craft the terms or
parameters by which an arising dispute will be handled in arbitration. Such flexibility is not
possible in litigation."), with DAVIS, supra note 7, at 171:
Another possible advantage is the flexibility of arbitration. The parties can
nominate the arbitrators, determine what procedure to follow, set the standards to
be applied in making a determination, and select what laws apply. The only
problem with these attributes is that it is rare for the parties to agree on these
points.
99. See NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 97, at 6.
100. See id. at 5-6.
101. Interview with Osamu Koike, Counsel, Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd., Intellectual
Property Legal Division, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 6, 2006) (noting that the resolution of
parallel disputes with foreign parties cannot always be accomplished during litigation for
jurisdictional reasons).
102. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 155 ("The resulting administrative opinion is treated as
'similar to an expert opinion'....").
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counsel. 10 3 These opinions generally assert in varying degrees of
vagueness that the client is not infringing on any patents, so far as the
counsel knows. The utility of such an opinion is somewhat limited,
for a variety of reasons.
First, the substance of a legal opinion will be of limited
credibility. The opposing counsel sitting across the discussion table
will take the position that Vladimir is infringing, even if the latter's
counsel has assured Vladimir that he is not. If the dispute is taken to
trial, the main role that the diligence opinion will play is to show non-
willfulness of the alleged infringement by Vladimir.' 
04
The opinion typically costs in excess of $30,000,105 but is
unlikely to take an absolute position one way or another unless the
party has paid more for it.106 Vladimir should not optimistically
expect the full and unconditional support from counsel unless he pays
for an insurance bond to cover the counsel's liability. 0 7 Taking this
103. One point of view, although perhaps less tenable now, was that when "a potential
infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due
care to determine whether or not he is infringing. . . Such an affirmative duty includes, inter
alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel . . . " Underwater
Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
As illustrated in note 104, infra, this is no longer a requirement.
104. Even though such opinions are not mandatory, and in Jack Schwartz Shoes, Inc. v.
Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), even unnecessary for the defendant
to fend off a willful infringement claim, the defendant's failure to obtain an opinion after actual
notice of potential infringement generally militates "strongly in favor of enhanced damages."
Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2002), rev'd,
350 F.3d 1348 (2003). But cf. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) ("The adverse inference that an opinion
was or would have been unfavorable, flowing from the infringer's failure to obtain or produce an
exculpatory opinion of counsel, is no longer warranted. Precedent authorizing such inference is
overruled.") and Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (reemphasizing that "there is no affirmative
obligation to obtain opinion of counsel."). None of this is meant to trivialize to importance of
obtaining and following the competent opinion, which can save a defendant found guilty from
treble damages per 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
105. Compare Menell, supra note 9, at 507 ("Opinion letters can cost in excess of $40,000
per patent asserted."), with DAVIS, supra note 7, at 368 (explaining that in the mid-nineties an
opinion of a legal expert may have cost from $5,000 to $20,000 in Japan).
106. Since diligence opinions can suffice in safely advising the client without taking a firm
position, risk-adverse counsel wishing to insulate themselves from potential malpractice suits
may be more willing to equivocate. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1992) ("An opinion of counsel, of course, need not unequivocally state that the client will not be
held liable for infringement. An honest opinion is more likely to speak of probabilities than
certainties."), abrogated by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc).
107. Outside counsel would presumably be reluctant to issue an absolute opinion that, if
ultimately shown to be wrong and incompetent, could readily open itself to a malpractice suit
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into consideration, Vladimir's accountants would rationally suggest
that he be open to offering a settlement payment of any amount less
than the insurance premium. 0 8 A lower-priced Hantei opinion of
unimpeachable technical and non-partisan competence would be a
welcome alternative.
The cost savings become much more apparent in the context of
litigation. U.S. patent litigation fees can easily end up in the millions
of dollars. 09 The early stage Markman hearing that determines the
legal claim construction is very expensive. Discovery in general is
very expensive. Nor are expert witnesses cheap to procure. Beyond
the trial level, moreover, the litigants will in the majority of cases
continue to be entangled by an adjudicatory appeal."10 To exacerbate
the financial burden, because claim construction is a question of
law,"' the results of the Markman hearing will be considered de
novo.112 This amounts to both parties having to suffer the most
expensive portion of trial twice." 
3
B. Arbitration in Japan
There are very few bodies in Japan that offer arbitration. The
primary organizations are the Japan Shipping Exchange ("JSE");' ' 4
the Japan Industrial Property Arbitration Center ("JIPAC"), 5
formerly the Arbitration Center for Industrial Property; and the
Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association ("JCAA").116 It is
and subject itself to potentially millions of dollars in liability for a mere $40,000 business item
(see note 105, supra) without some sort of indemnity to insulate itself.
108. If no other course of action is available to escape liability.
109. "The cost to bring a patent case ... ranges from $750,000 to $1 million for a simple
dispute and from $4 million to $8 million for a modest one. Monster cases can cost $10 million
or more." 1P WORLDWIDE, May 2002, at 43. See also AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2005, 1-108 (2005) (showing that the average cost
of litigation for cases where the amount in controversy is less than $1 million is $770,000).
110. See Kimberly M. Ruch-Alegant, Note, Markman: In Light of De Novo Review,
Parties to Patent Infringement Litigation Should Consider the ADR Option, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L.
& TECH. J. 307, 308 (1998) (observing that "unless the losing party is out of money and time,
that party will most likely appeal.").
111. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 387-88, 391 (1996).
112. Id. (determining that claim construction is a question of law, and so the de novo
standard applies on appeal).
113. See Ruch-Alegant, supra note 110, at 308 (as a consequence of Markman, de novo
review effectively means re-litigating the case).
114. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 156.
115. Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 244.
116. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 156.
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regrettable that none of these institutions are heavily relied upon, due
in part to the public's general ignorance of arbitration. 17
The benefits of arbitrating patent disputes in Japan are similar to
those in the U.S., already enumerated in Part IV(A), supra. Successful
arbitration of a patent dispute in Japan might even result in
proportionately more monetary savings than in the U.S., because
would-be litigants could forego a second costly discovery at the
appellate stage in addition to the fact-finding at trial. "18
Parties utilizing arbitration in Japan typically reach a resolution
within 6 months.1 9 The initial request fee may be just under $500.120
This request fee is followed by investigation fees, which will run
between $900 and $1,800.121 In addition, there are charges for each
hearing, as well as a surcharge of 1.5 to 10% of monetary
settlement. 122
Given the litany of costs, the choice of the most cost-effective or
appropriate means of dispute resolution should not be regarded
blithely. It is not unheard of for arbitration in Japan to "be more
expensive than patent litigation itself.' 123 As such, the advantages of
arbitration must be weighed carefully against its disadvantages;
otherwise the ultimate winner of the dispute may find that the system
has cheated him out of his expected returns. Having chosen a
mechanism less than optimally compatible to his needs and resources,
he will suffer the suboptimal prescription that it mechanically returns.
117. Id. at 174. There are, of course, other reasons that shall be elucidated in Part VII(A),
infra.
118. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 68, 361 (appellate courts review questions of facts and
law de novo and can engage in their own fact-finding). This estimation assumes that the parties
are resolute and irreconcilable enough to litigate up through the appellate level.
119. See Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 244.
120. See id. But cf. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 169 (representing that $5,000 was the initial
request fee).
121. See Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 244.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 246. Furthermore, if both avenues of dispute resolution are unprofitable, and
there is no accessible alternative free of institutional disincentives, the would-be plaintiff may
well be discouraged from asserting his rights. This is the revisionist paradigm explaining why
the Japanese pursue legal or administrative remedies. See KENNETH L. PORT, JAPANESE
TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1998) (suggesting that the Japanese "forego rights not because
they affirmatively want to, but rather because the system is so inept at dealing with their case
that they are forced to forego these rights.").
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V. REALISTIC CHALLENGES FACED BY U.S. PATENT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
A. Problems with Alternative Dispute Resolution
For all of its benefits, ADR - especially arbitration - is not
without its own drawbacks. Patent disputes by nature may
"necessitate that parties take their disputes to court" rather than resort
to ADR.12 4 Among the countervailing concerns are the following: (1)
The high-stakes nature of most patent disputes militate for the
adjudicative finality of stare decisis;'25 (2) if there is an appeal, the
review of the arbitral award would be de novo;' 26 (3) dissatisfaction
with early and potentially unfavorable finality for those who can
afford to litigate through the appellate stage; 127 (4) the adversarial
relationship of the parties who ardently want their day in court and
object to compromise verdicts;128 (5) the significance and precedential
value of judicially validated patents; 129 (6) the paramount public
interest in discovering patent invalidity which confidential
extrajudicial resolutions would suppress; 130  and (7) the Lear
doctrine.'31
124. Lim, supra note 96, at 187.
125. See id. at 174-75.
126. See id. at 187.
127. See id. at 176-77.
128. See id at 181-82. Arbitrators may devise Solomonic solutions to the chagrin of
parties who would rather have a definitive win-lose result rather than a lukewarm win-win
outcome.
129. See id. at 177-80. The precedential value should not be overestimated, however, since
collateral estoppel may not bar non-partics to making the same argument, nor is a ruling of
validity ever conclusive of the patent's validity (unlike a ruling of invalidity).
130. See id. at 184-85.
131. "The 'Lear doctrine' states that the public has a strong interest in patent validity,
which should be determined by courts, and suggests that an arbitration of patent validity may
not be binding on the parties." Id. at 171 n.97 (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)).
See also Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 ("Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are
muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without
need or justification."). While disagreeing with the majority's reluctance to apply its new rule to
state-governed trade secrets, Justice Black ultimately concurred with the rule's application to
patents, concluding that "[tihe national policy expressed in the patent laws, favoring free
competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private agreements among
individuals, with or without the approval of the State." Id. at 677 (Black, J., dissenting).
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B. Problems with Litigation
The frustrations with and shortcomings of litigation have already
been highlighted by Vladimir's plight at the end in Part II, supra,
where he was put "in the position of having to choose between
abandoning a particular business venture or bringing matters to a head
by engaging in arguably infringing activity."' 3 2 In addition, there are
the excessive front-loaded costs of discovery-heavy litigation and the
inconveniences inherent in a protracted, adversarial, technical
proceeding whose core issue is a legal question.'33 In short, the
problems of litigation abound, with the flipside of each of the benefits
of ADR listed in Part IV, supra, as a corresponding pejorative.
Furthermore, the outcome of litigation is highly unpredictable.
With a high reversal rate, 34 patent litigation is quite aptly a "dance on
the razor's edge."'' 35 It is neither efficient nor affordable. District
courts are too many and too ill equipped to handle technical disputes
with consistency, and yet they are courts of first instance.' 3 6 The
expenses of preparing for litigation and attorneys' fees at the trial
level are a sunk cost, and this initial stage of trial but a rite of passage.
The more knowledgeable and circumspect interpreter is the Federal
Circuit, but it only lends its wisdom on appeal. 37 Uniform claim
interpretation is thus bought with the price of appeals, 38 to the
chagrin of every indigent litigant who cannot afford to prosecute the
merits of his case at the high-roller's table.
Not only is appellate adjudication unsatisfactorily unpredictable,
but from the outset litigation is unsavorily imbalanced. Usually, the
defendant will find himself being unexpectedly hailed into court on
132. Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
overruled by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
133. See Ruch-Alegant, supra note 110, at 323 (concluding that losing parties in patent
trials "will almost automatically appeal" every time, purse- and time-permitting); see also id. at
308 (noting that on appeal, the de novo review of claim construction mandated by Markman,
517 U.S. 370, 372, 391 (1996), means practically re-litigating the case anew).
134. See Lim, supra note 96, at 176 ("The Federal Circuit reverses these district court
judgments of validity and infringement twenty-two and twenty percent of the time,
respectively.").
135. Pasternak & Nelson, supra note 44, at 1060.
136. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 165 (explaining why uniformity of decision in the U.S.
comes at a high price).
137. Further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is authoritative, but even more expensive.
138. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 165 ("The Federal Circuit can provide such uniformity,
and it is also a knowledgeable interpreter of patent claims. But centralizing claim interpretation
in the Federal Circuit also has its costs.").
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his adversary's "terms and convenience."' 39 Without the initiative,
Vladimir will lose control of which District Court the suit is
ultimately brought, and remain vulnerable in a state of unease until
Estragon finally decides when it is best on his schedule to bring suit.
Vladimir gives up home court advantage, the element of surprise, and
valuable trial preparation time.
140
The disadvantages incumbent in waiting for a suit incentivize a
first-strike attempt at invalidation, but the recurring problem is that
Vladimir might not have standing to initiate either an invalidation
proceeding in court or a reexamination by the PTO until he has made
an investment that he is reluctant to risk. 14 The system is currently
structured such that Vladimir will have 20/20 vision in hindsight but
he may be exasperatingly blind to the fact that Estragon is staring him
in the face, even if Vladimir has already attempted to identify with
reasonable diligence every patent that he is potentially infringing.
Vladimir is trapped at an impasse, 42 limited to reactive rather than
proactive measures.
Of course, Vladimir could always approach Estragon and,
through any one of ADR's many platforms, try to obtain a license to
the latter's patent. However, while this method does eliminate the risk
of litigation and payment of damages, it runs the risk of Vladimir
paying more than was due in the case of a false positive. 43 Vladimir's
139. See Pastemak & Nelson, supra note 44, at 1065.
140. See id
141. Cf. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002) (discussing in the context of the doctrine of equivalents, "[i]f competitors cannot be
certain about a patent's extent, . they may invest by mistake in competing products that the
patent secures.").
142. The situation likens to having "the sword of Damocles ... hanging overhead." Frank,
supra note 29.
143. Had the dispute gone to trial, the jury might have found that Vladimir's activity was
non-infringing. But the threat of litigation alone may serve as deterrence to development in that
technical area, or force reluctant licensees to pay supra-competitive prices to avoid litigation. On
a macroscopic level, this amounts to a significant harm to the public and the economy,
exacerbated if the patent were actively trolled to harass small entities. The Lear Court seized
upon a similar concern, reasoning that if licensees were "muzzled [from challenging the
invalidity of the licensed patent], the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-
be monopolists without need or justification." Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
However, Vladimir might consider the option of taking a license, paying under protest, and
filing for declaratory judgment. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777
(2007) (holding that a licensee does not need to refuse to pay the debt due under the licensing
contract to have standing to sue for the invalidation of licensor's patent). One drawback is that
the licensee may lose and end up paying needless litigation costs. His is a trade-off, then,
between unnecessary royalty payments and unnecessary litigation fees. Vladimir will be able to
discover just how gratuitous his license payments are, but at the price of court fees and
attorneys' fees. The second drawback to this strategy is that one of its two outcomes ultimately
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business decision is impaired by the lack of an unbiased, authoritative
assessment about his venture's interplay with Estragon's patent.144
VI. PROPOSALS
A. The Missing Link: What is lacking in the U.S.?
In ADR schemes as well as litigation, there is want of a central,
unifying source of advisory authority - short of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit - that is knowledgeable, credible, reliable,
objective, and both more celeritously and financially accessible than
the Federal Circuit to private parties. Grave and precarious is the
situation of a potential defendant who is unsure of how to conform his
conduct so that, absent of closing shop, he may safely steer clear of
costly suits. Vladimir's predicament at the end of Part II, supra,
illustrated that Vladimir was unwilling or unable to use any
mechanism, including licensing, to diagnose the likelihood of his
being liable for infringement on Estragon's patent before making his
investment, so he would either have to abandon the idea or risk the
does not inform Vladimir of whether his activity or patent reads on the licensor's claims: If the
court finds that Estragon's patent is invalid, Vladimir can practice his patent for free; but if
Estragon's patent is valid, Vladimir has not only suffered the costs of litigation, but he still
might not know whether the licensing payments are necessary. Even if Estragon's patent is
valid, Vladimir might not be infringing. This second drawback may be mitigated, though, if
Vladimir seeks a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement at the same time.
144. Estragon, on the other hand, has an option unavailable to the Vladimir. In limited
circumstances, Estragon could lodge a complaint with the International Trade Commission
("ITC"), which could issue injunctive relief after an administrative hearing. See Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) (2000). One of the advantages of the ITC route
is that it saves time and litigation expenses. Steve Seidenberg, Patent Rocket Docket: Patent
Holders Choose the International Trade Commission for Fast, Powerful Results, 93 A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 2007, at 38 (contrasting how ITC judges usually issue a decision "within 14 months" with
how "it takes at least 22 months for an infringement case to go to trial in most district courts.").
However, it suffers from certain deficiencies that prevent it from completely supplanting the
demand for either patent litigation or a Hantei Request System. For instance, it is unlikely that
Vladimir would lodge a complaint with the ITC and invite an investigation of his own activities.
To the extent that the potential defendant would prefer discretion, this administrative approach
seems more pro-plaintiff. But for Estragon as well, the ITC cannot award him damages. See id.
He will still have to file a suit in district court to seek compensation. Secondly, because the ITC
can only grant injunctive relief, there may be less of a deterrent effect on infringers. Supposing
the injunction is issued, the parties would negotiate a license to continue operations according to
the Coase Theorem, and the end result would be the same as if the district court could only
award reasonable royalties for future instances of infringement. The consequences of greatly
diminished deterrence in this scenario are discussed in greater detail in Part VII(A)(2), infra, in
the context of the Japanese legal system. Thirdly, the ITC can only investigate instances where
the alleged infringer is importing goods into the U.S., limiting this option to a narrow subset of
cases. Id.
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whole of his investment and more. 145 A high-risk, low-gain
environment is far from ideal to encourage industries to innovate
"[s]cience and useful [a]rts".146
At the same time, the dual invalidation authority in the U.S.
deserves attention. At present, the situation is unbalanced because the
PTO has only the power to invalidate, while the courts have both the
power to invalidate and to find infringement. Whether this inequality
is acceptable may well depend on the desirability and availability of
alternate constructs. 1
47
The first proposal is for mutual exclusion - the PTO would hold
the power to invalidate patents exclusively, leaving the courts with
only the exclusive power to determine infringement. However, this
may lead to unacceptable delays and increased court costs as it did in
Japan before the 2004 amendment of its Patent Law, which was
alluded to in Part III, supra. The courts would take a hands-off
approach and pass the invalidity determination to the JPO, a
procedure that usually proved to be inefficient in light of the fact that
the latter determination would take longer than the trial itself. 48 This
is not an attractive proposal to either litigant.
The second proposal is for mutual inclusion - both the PTO and
the District Courts would have the authority to invalidate patents and
determine infringement. This is a weak proposal for different reasons.
Each governmental branch, in exercising overlapping dual authority,
will engender the potential for reaching inconsistent, conflicting
results; incentivize forum shopping; and introduce more confusion
into an already unpredictable system.
The third proposal takes a step back and calls for a re-
conceptualization of the paradigm. Instead of viewing the dynamic in
145. Not only might Estragon recover his lost profits, he might even be able to win treble
damages from Vladimir for willful infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (the court may
punitively treble the compensatory damages). Willful infringement determinations, however,
could become less common with future legislation. See, e,g,, Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371
(overruling the negligence standard set in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), and requiring instead objective recklessness as a precondition to
awarding punitive damages) and Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5(b)(2)
(2007) (articulating a "clear and convincing evidence" standard for a finding of willful
infringement).
146. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries").
147. Practically, the delineation of the powers of the PTO and the federal courts ultimately
depends on Congress, but should the public seize on tenable and better alternatives, Congress
could be moved by public opinion to reconsider.
148. Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 411,413.
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terms of a power struggle, the process could be treated as a fair
division of labor towards a collective goal. The court can enter the
final judgment, but the PTO, having adopted a mechanism similar to
the Hantei Request System, could be consulted by either litigant or
the court for Hantei evidence, which in turn would be considered as a
persuasive predetermination. The PTO's finding could also act as
presumptive evidence, clear and convincing evidence, 149 or even
conclusive evidence in favor of either party. Alternatively, the courts
may treat the PTO like a magistrate whose fact-finding it may accept
at face value.
There are many attractive elements in this third proposal. It is
less invasive and radical than either of the first two proposals.
Moreover, it is conceptually palatable, because there is a close
relation between the validity of a patent and its infringement to begin
with. 150 The PTO is deemed competent to evaluate the validity of
patents, and so its competence in assessing infringement is at least
defensible. 151 In light of how "[c]onstruing the claims is always the
first step in an infringement or validity analysis,"'152 the courts and the
PTO examiners, while performing their respective duties, engage in
the same methodology, at least initially. The overlap in routine leads
to the inference that the PTO would not find completely foreign the
idea of evaluating claims for infringement, nor would its actual
performance of such be gauche.
Whether an invention can be validly patented and whether it
infringes 53 a prior patent is teleologically the same characteristic.
Anticipation - a core inquiry in determining the initial patentability
and later in determining validity upon reexamination - and
infringement merely rest at opposite ends of a time spectrum. "That
149. If used offensively, the Hantei might provide the same clear and convincing evidence
required under 35 U.S.C. § 282 to invalidate a legitimate patent. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v.
Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
150. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 861 ("Literal infringement is analogous to
anticipation.").
151. Cf. Aluminum Fabricating Co. of Pittsburgh v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d
314, 316 (2d Cir. 1958) ("In a case such as this, where [both the trademark is strong and the
challenger of the mark's validity has also presented strong evidence against the presumption],
the courts should not overrule the action of the Patent Office to whose care Congress has
entrusted the preliminary determination as to whether a mark fulfills the requirements of the
statute"). Similarly Congress has entrusted the PTO the preliminary determination as to whether
a patent application fulfils the rigorous requirements of the corresponding statute, and is not
anticipated.
152. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 860.
153. At least literal infringement, if not infringement by the doctrine of equivalents.
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which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.' 54 Thus, if the
PTO's professionals were to review the claims for infringement
together, theoretically they would be making a partially similar if not
the same inquiry again, whereas the District Court would be viewing
it on first impression.
Granted, the PTO examiners may also be seeing the claims for
the first time. The two patents might have been handled by different
art units; or, relevant prior art may have been overlooked or
unidentified by the search; or, the original examiners are no longer
employees at the PTO; or, each examiner focused on the disclosure of
the patent applications rather than the claims. This last point will be
discussed in more detail below.
B. Why implementing the Hantei Request System in the U.S.
should usher in benefits
The Hantei Request System could aid litigation practice and
improve other areas whose users would benefit by being able to
predict the very consequences of litigation that they seek to avoid. It
would accomplish this by affording the public a means of early
detection,'55 which would in turn bolster the reliability of claims of
PTO-issued patents.
Next, judicial acceptance of Hantei would promote both
patentees' and the public's reliance on judicial decisions and the
PTO's patents, by streamlining the interpretative standards against
which patent claims will be measured.156 This would ensure the
smooth development of new technology. Both corporate and small
entities will know how to better conform their conduct so as to not
154. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889). See also Beckson Marine v.
NFM, 292 F.3d 718, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reasoning how "that which will [literally] infringe, if
later, will anticipate, if earlier.") (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Robertson, 169 F.3d
743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the test for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is "that
'each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently, in a
single prior art reference."' (quoting Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed.
Cir. 1987))). Analogously, that which, if earlier, would have anticipated by rendering the
invention obvious could be infringing per doctrine of equivalents if later.
155. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 148 ("Opining on ambiguities in claims may improve the
PTO's ability to detect and eliminate such ambiguity prior to the issuance of a patent, which, in
turn, would improve the certainty and reliability of patent rights generally.").
156. After all, long before any suit was brought, the issuance of the patent by the PTO had
put the public and subsequent inventors on notice of the particular claim language and scope in
the patent on which ultimately the "patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office agreed ......
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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infringe if the courts do not regularly second-guess the PTO's
decisions.
157
The public would witness a corollary benefit with the increased
uniformity and predictability of claim construction and invalidation.
Even if infringement is left strictly to the province of the courts, no
evidentiary rule or constitutional principle expressly prohibits judges
from relying on the PTO as experts. In determining whether the
claims of one patent literally reads on another, the court will need
tools to decipher the meaning of the claims of both patents. 158 Each
patent will rely on its own specifications 159 to define its claims,
likening the specifications to the public's and the court's dictionary.
However, having two discrete dictionaries, one for each patent, will
limit their utility in the cross-parsing. 60 Here, the role of the PTO
would be to provide the objective, official, unifying thesaurus. 161
157. Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 389. See also Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996):
As we noted in General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369
(1938), "[t]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee,
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the
subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public." Otherwise, a
"zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the
risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field," United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,
317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942), and "[t]he public [would] be deprived of rights
supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these
rights." Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877).
158. "Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a
thing in a patent application. . . . The language in the patent claims may not capture every
nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty." Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
159. And other intrinsic evidence, such as its prosecution history and overall claim
consistency. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320-23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
("[T]he methodology [that the Texas Digital court] adopted placed too much reliance on
extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises, and encyclopedias and too little on intrinsic
sources, in particular the specification and prosecution history.").
160. Ruling out fraud or piracy, it is likely that the terminology in the disclosure of each
patent will have been independently chosen by each patentee, leaving the court with two
separate glossaries covering two different dialects.
161. See Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
abrogated by Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303:
Dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, publicly available at the time the patent
is issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable sources of information on
the established meanings that would have been attributed to the terms of the
claims by those of skill in the art. Such references are unbiased reflections of
common understanding not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent
to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the
motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation. Indeed, these materials may
be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better
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After a patent has been granted, 35 U.S.C. § 282 gives the patent
a presumption of validity that the challenger must overcome by clear
and convincing evidence.' 62 This should be a major consideration in
favor of non-infringement for the subsequent patent, ideally giving
rise to a presumption of non-infringement as well, because the PTO
must have examined the prior art and checked for anticipation. A
District Court Judge seeing the disputed claims for the first time may
be inclined to give deference to an administrative body or agent
thereof that has already reviewed the claims 163 for non-anticipation
and therefore implicitly made an indirect finding as to the non-
infringement by this subsequent patent.164
One point that disfavors this proposal is that if' 65 and when the
PTO examiner initially conducts the prior art search, he will focus on
the prior art teachings. When the focus is limited to what is taught by
the disclosures of prior patents,' 66 the examiner might not scrutinize
understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in
the art to describe the technology.
Id. Even though the Federal Circuit, in Phillips, retreated from this position of holding technical
dictionaries in high regard and affording them great weight, the advantages of having an
objective authority to reference were not undermined nor disavowed. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320-
23. The PTO could fill this role as a figurative dictionary with the implementation of the Hantei
Request System, especially since the PTO would have participated in manufacturing and
modifying the intrinsic evidence during its examiners' interaction with the applicants, unlike a
real dictionary.
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a
patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be
presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim..."); Neff Instrument Corp. v.
Cohu Elecs. Inc., 298 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1961) ("A presumption of validity, which can only
be overcome by clear and convincing proof, arises from the issuance of a patent. This
presumption is based upon the expertness of the Patent Office.").
163. A parallel administrative mechanism allows would-be plaintiffs to seek, where
possible, rulings from the tech-savvy administrative law judges in the International Trade
Commission, which "tend to hold up unusually well on appeal to the Federal Court."
Seidenberg, supra note 144, at 38.
164. And even if the initial prior art search was not thorough enough and the first patent,
having slipped through the cracks, was never reviewed in the context of granting the second
patent, a quick and low-cost Hantei request before litigation is the expeditious answer to
resolving the dispute of infringement. Granted, the PTO does not have enough resources to
scrutinize the claims of every prior patent for every patent application, but this does not mean
that it cannot spare three examiners per request when the requester has already singled out the
two patents whose claims are to be compared.
165. An applicant may perform his own search under expedited filing. See 37 C.F.R. §
1.155(a)(2) (2004) (listing a pre-examination search as a prerequisite to an applicant's request
for accelerated examination").
166. Or printed publications or published patent applications. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b),
(e) (2000); 1 MPEP, supra note 8, § 904. ("The examiner, after having obtained a thorough
understanding of the invention disclosed and claimed in the nonprovisional application, then
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the claims of the prior patents, or understandably overlook their
overlap with the sought claims.' 67 So even though the PTO is focusing
on the disclosures, it may miss the importance of a prior disclosure in
context of the purportedly new claims before them. This is especially
true if the patent only includes the minimum requirement of one
embodiment for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to show
possession) 68 The examiner is unlikely to consistently predict every
unstated embodiment of each prior patent and relate it to the present
application. Further difficulties result from inventors' attempts to
patent the structures of their ideas,' 69 rather than the specific and
oftentimes unforeseen applications of their ideas.
170
The main thrust of the criticism, then, is that the PTO is no better
than the District Court judge at comparing and contrasting two patents
searches the prior art as disclosed in patents and other published documents, i.e., nonpatent
literature (NPL).").
167. The enabling characteristic of the disclosure is what anticipates and denies
patentability. See, e.g., Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Boumonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926)
(holding that a prior patent that did not fully claim what it disclosed would still bar from
patentability a subsequent application that did claim the former's unclaimed subject matter).
168. See 2 MPEP, supra note 8, § 2106; Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the disclosure of a single embodiment in an application is enough
to provide sufficient teaching and anticipate future patents under 35 U.S.C. § 102).
169. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002):
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of
drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is
novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep
abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but
words for things.
(citing Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (1967)).
170. When the PTO examiner scrutinizes a patent application, he will consider grounds for
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, among others. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966) ("[T]he §103 condition.., lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the
scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue are to be ascertained .... ) (citations omitted). However, the prior art references
he cites under 35 U.S.C. § 103 will be limited to those in fields analogous to the subject matter
of the applicant's invention. See generally In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992):
Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1)
whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem
addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved.
Prior art references that the examiner may call upon to bar the application on 35 U.S.C. § 102
grounds, unfortunately, have no such restriction, and can be derived from any field of endeavor
or have been invented for any purpose. The breadth of scope may tax the examiner's ability to
detect anticipating applications of prior art in unrelated fields.
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in the first instance. However, having a Hantei Request System
whereby three examiners, experts in the narrow field of art171 in which
the patents are classified, jointly review both patents will seriously
undercut this argument, especially if among the three chosen there
happens to be at least one examiner who previously handled the
prosecution of any of the patents' original applications.' 
72
The Hantei Request procedure will serve seven additional
functions: (1) Act as reinforcement of prior validity determinations to
reaffirm confidence in the PTO's expertise;
(2) amicably sort out the false conflicts in the universe of currently
active patent claims to reduce inconsistency in claim construction and
increase predictability; (3) mandate the scrutiny of the claims of the
two patents in a distraction-free vacuum rather than considering the
universe of prior and occasionally extraneous disclosures; '1 (4) test
the robustness of patents that are fencing off certain practices from
the public domain;174 (5) ensure that society has the full benefit of
robust and mutually exclusive patents, such that licensees will not
have to license from a plurality of patentees in fear that otherwise he
might expose himself to a multiplicity of infringement suits; (6)
eliminate bias in judicial proceedings against foreign patentees; 75 and
(7) liberate and optimize judicial resources.
Some of the greatest benefits derived will be manifest in both
judicial and extra-judicial contexts. In particular, the Hantei Request
procedure preserves anonymity and promotes results. The anonymity
provided not only dispels the fear of bringing a suit that ultimately
backfires in the form of a counterclaim, but also the fear of being
171. The PTO has at least 271 art units to which the handling of patent applications is
divided and assigned. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, USPTO SHOULD
REASSESS HOW EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE, APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD
SYSTEM STIMULATE AND REWARD EXAMINER PRODUCTION, FINAL REPORT IPE-15722 i
(2004). ("PTO's patent corps has 8 technology centers that process patents. Together, the
centers have 271 art units, each with a staff of examiners that specializes in a unique technology,
scientific method, or classification."). See also I MPEP, supra note 8, § 504.
172. This contrasts with the general office policy of the PTO when dealing with
reexamination proceedings. See 2 MPEP, supra note 8, § 2236 (the supervisory examiner of the
art unit "will assign the reexamination request to an examiner different from the examiner(s)
who examined the patent application.").
173. A court will not be able to do this during an invalidation proceeding, nor the PTO
during reexamination.
174. The object would be to filter out weak, overlapping patents in favor of strong ones.
See Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 407.
175. See id. at 391 (advocating that greater reliance on each country's patent office may
eliminate national differences).
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haled to court on an adversary's terms and convenience.176 Hantei
prevents the divestment of the choice of forum, thereby preserving it
for those who are wary of litigation but who nonetheless would
consider it.
Also admirable is the high accessibility of the Hantei Request
procedure, which costs less than reexamination or invalidation
proceedings to finance, 177 and requires less of the applicant, as
compared to the stringent requirements of standing for declaratory
judgment or restrictive burdens of production for reexamination. 178 A
would-be plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment may not yet have
developed the invention or rendered it patentable, but would still like
a predetermination of likelihood of infringement before making the
investment to further develop his concept. 179 The lack of standing
requirements or restrictions upon applicant status180 in requesting a
Hantei overcomes this hurdle.' 1
8
The attractiveness of anonymity thus extends to assuring that his
investment will not be needlessly jeopardized, a contingency that
plagued Vladimir in his quest for declaratory judgment at the end of
Part II, supra.182 Similarly, one who avails himself of an advisory
176. See Pasternak & Nelson, supra note 44, at 1065. These concerns were previously
highlighted in Part V, supra.
177. Compare GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 1(2)(B)(b) (the request costs 40,000
Japanese yen, amounting to less than $400) with 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1) (2004) (An ex parte
reexamination costs $2,520 to initiate) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(2) (2004) (An inter partes
reexamination would cost $8,800 to initiate). See also Frank, supra note 29 ("A reexamination
proceeding can cost each side S10 000 to $100 000 ....").
178. See also 37 C.F.R. 1.510(b)(l); 2 MPEP, supra note 8, §§ 2216, 2609(C) (requestor
must raise a "substantial new question" addressing the patentability of the invention that was not
covered during the original examination). See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-307, and § 312(a)
(2000 & Supp. IV 2006). This concern was raised in Part II, supra.
179. Cf Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 732
(2002) ("If competitors cannot be certain about a patent's extent, they may be deterred from
engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in
competing products that the patent secures.").
180. See GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § I(3)(A) (anyone may request one). See also
TOKKYo HO [PATENT LAW], No. 220 of 1999, art. 71.
181. While the lack of more stringent standing requirements may open this procedure to
abuse, patentees and their assigns need not fear the hectoring of Hantei requesters. As long as
the imported implementation of the Hantei Request procedure retains its advisory, non-binding
character, the potential for its abuse is minimal.
182. This assumes that he has painstakingly already acquired legal standing. See, e.g.,
Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Plaintiff
may not, for example, obtain a declaratory judgment merely because it would like an advisory
opinion on whether it would be liable for patent infringement if it were to initiate some merely
contemplated activity."). Vladimir must have established by "meaningful preparation" in the
potentially infringing activity that he has a "true interest to be protected by the declaratory
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opinion will be immune from the business-world blacklisting that
would have been virtually guaranteed had he sought reexamination or
invalidation of another's patent instead. This is possible only because
the Hantei requester need not be an interested party. 183 A dummy
applicant or middleman may be employed to submit the request.
184
A Hantei Request System eliminates the deterrent to seeking the
assurance that an inventor needs before making his investment.'
Vladimir can go ahead with his idea and design around 186 Estragon's
prior patent, reducing his invention to practice, and promoting "the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts". 187
There is a plethora of uses for Hantei in evidence and
negotiations, be it in the arena of ADR, pre-litigation preparation, or
litigation. 88 On its face the Hantei Request System appears to be rife
with advantage and promise.
judgment." Id. However, where he merely seeks assurance rather than protection, and where the
prerequisites for judicial protection are more than he can afford, he should be able to seek the
advisory opinion from an alternative, extra-judiciary source.
183. See GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § l(3)(A) ("Parties requesting Hantei opinions are
not required to have legal interest in the Hantei result. However, from the perspective of the
purpose of the system, the demander must briefly explain their need to demand a Hantei opinion
in the space for reason in the Hantei demand form.").
184. Interview with Hironari Kawashima, Kobe Steel, Ltd., Intellectual Property
Department, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 30, 2006).
185. And he could seek assurance without violating the spirit of the "reasonable
apprehension" prong of the test for judicial standing, which restricted the grounds for
declaratory judgments for fear of an onslaught of suits against patentees. Cf Arrowhead Indus.,
846 F.2d at 736 ("If, on the other hand, defendant has done nothing but obtain a patent, there
can be no basis for the required apprehension, a rule that protects quiescent patent owners
against unwarranted litigation."). Because the Hantei Request System specifically avoids
litigation and does not jeopardize the would-be defendant's patent rights, it would be available
to Vladimir where for policy reasons the declaratory judgment might not.
186. See Giles S. Rich, Foreword to DONALD S. CHISUM ET. AL., supra note 26, at iii;
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002):
[T]he patent laws require inventors to describe their work in "full, clear, concise,
and exact terms," 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the delicate balance the law
attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to
bring the invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue
innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights.
(citation omitted).
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
188. The JPO has recommended that Hantei evidence be used for:
(a) Confirmation of patent infringement (continuation or cessation of working)
(b) Resolution of conflict by agreement of the parties involved in accordance
with Hantei results (especially useful for petty disputes)
(c) Various uses in legal proceedings:
(i) As documentary evidence proving infringement
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VII.DELIBERATION
A. Why Hantei might be a Better Fit for the U.S. than for Japan
In Japan, a variety of factors may account for any suboptimal
capitalization of the Hantei Request procedure: The populace's
unfamiliarity with and underutilization of the local arbitration system;
the lackluster appeal of a low cost-benefit ratio in relying on
arbitration; a lenient judicial system; and the lack of statutory punitive
damages. Each is analyzed in turn below.
1. Deficiencies of Arbitration
Beyond the enumerated reasons in Part V(A), supra, regarding
the incompatibilities of arbitration with patent disputes in particular,
arbitration in Japan also suffers from a few endemic deficiencies.
Compared to the U.S., arbitration is poorly understood in Japan,'
89
and, therefore, underused. 190 The lack of this platform impairs the
opportunities for relying on Hantei. Even if a Hantei opinion were
requested, there would be no receptive forum, formal or informal, in
which to communicate the import of the finding with the other party,
or to posture oneself in zero-sum situations. In other words, because
there is no adequate forum, there is no pressing need to apply for a
Hantei to help convince the opposing party who will never show.
From 1991 to 1993, for instance, the JCAA received only three
to six newly filed requests for arbitration annually, many of which
(ii) As documentary evidence proving the item in question is an equivalent
(evidence regarding the patentability of the item in question)
(iii) As documentary evidence proving non-existence of cause of action in
equitable action for injunction or in common law for claiming damages
(d) Indication of patent numbers on goods
(e) Use in negotiation for licensing, license agreement or transfer agreement
(f) Use as an attachment to an application or information provision document
(request of shoreline control of infringing goods) to customs
(g) As a document providing the Police with grounds for accusation
(h) As a document supporting a demand made to an arbitration institution
(i) As evidence in a warning letter or rebuttal against such warnings
() As a document to support claims of infringement of registered rights or
antitrust laws
(k) As grounds to demand to the courts the opportunity to state an opinion if a
claim seeking provisional injunction is submitted.
GUIDELtNES, supra note 2, at § 1 (2)(A).
189. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 174 (noting the general ignorance of arbitration).
190. See Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 245.
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were subsequently withdrawn.' 91 Similarly, the JSE only received
three to five new disputes annually in the early 1990s.192 By contrast,
the American Arbitration Association received about 63,000 new
cases in 1993.193
The ignorance of or under-reliance upon institutional arbitrators
might also be ascribed to the novelty of the idea of submitting patent
disputes to arbitration, and to the newness of the institutions
themselves. It was only recently that patent disputes could be
submitted for arbitration. 194 As late as 1996, arbitral awards from
patent disputes were not enforceable. 195
Another general disincentive to employing arbitration in Japan is
the practical concern of personal expenditure. The $5,000 initial
request fee is "not inexpensive."'196 Later incurred administrative fees
are based on the value of the claims, ranging between $5,000 and
$140,000.'9' Not only this, but arbitration may take the same amount
of time as litigation to conclude.' 98 In an engagement so protracted, it
is not inconceivable that arbitration could cost as much as
litigation, 199 if not more. 200 Exacerbating this risk is the possibility
that even when the ultimate decision is favorable, the potential gains
are dwarfed by those derivable through litigation, because arbitrators
are more conservative than the courts and reluctant to craft large
damage awards that cannot be easily appealed. 20 1 The potential of a
higher cost for arbitrating disputes than litigating them, combined
with the probability of a smaller arbitral award than a final,
adjudicated damages award, necessitate against the use of arbitration.
191. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 160.
192. Id. at 156.
193. Id. at 160. 63,000 is the number of total cases received. Since the main thrust of the
argument is that arbitration is little known or infrequently utilized in Japan in general, the U.S.
rate of patent arbitration is not considered.
194. Cf id. at 158 (noting that patents were not arbitrable in Japan as of 1996).
195. See id. But cf Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 244 (noting that judges
now encourage parties submit their patent disputes to arbitration).
196. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 169. But see Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 244
(suggesting that the initial request fee is under $500).
197. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 169.
198. See id. at 164, 172 (29 months). But see Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at
244 (noting that arbitral resolution could be achieved in 6 months).
199. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 172.
200. Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 246 (conceding that arbitration may cost
more than litigation).
201. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 173.
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In sum, the unfamiliarity with and impracticality of entertaining
arbitration are understandably formidable barriers to the Japanese
public's ability to embrace it. It may just be that in Japan, arbitration
is seldom relied on because "the disadvantages outweigh the
advantages . 202
2. Deficiencies of Litigation
As with domestic arbitration, the Japanese judicial machinery
also suffers from idiosyncratic properties that foreclose a potential
legitimate forum in which Hantei might be heard. These
idiosyncrasies include the lack of adequate judicial deterrent and its
symmetric effect - the lack of adequate judicial remedy.
In Japan, the opportunity to call upon Hantei may have been
negatively impacted by the statistical rarity of infringement findings,
which in turn stemmed from the lack of judicial application of the
doctrine of equivalents before 1998.203 Claims were narrowly read as
a consequence of the courts' reluctance to invalidate a "questionable"
patent altogether.20 4 This phenomenon might also have been
attributable to a presumption that if a patent could survive the 5-year
opposition period unscathed, it was a strong, meritorious patent.20 5
But this issue is effectively moot now that both the doctrine of
equivalents has been adopted 20 6 and the post-issuance opposition
202. Id. at 17l1.
203. See Tsubakimoto Seiko Co., Ltd. v. THK K.K., 52 MINSHO 113 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 24,
1998) (vacating and remanding to the Tokyo High Court the infringement analysis, with orders
to consider the equivalents of claim elements based on the fulfillment of five conditions),
translation available at http://www.softic.or.jp/en/cases/Tsubakimoto-vTHK.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2007).
204. See Motsenbocker, supra note 15, at 407.
205. Compare to Lanham Act §§ 15 and 33(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065 and 1115(b) (2000)
(U.S. trademarks become incontestable and are afforded a conclusive presumption of validity if
after registration, there is five years of continuous use and no adverse final decision as to its
validity in that interim).
206. See Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 261 (noting that the Japanese
Supreme Court permitted a finding of infringement under doctrine of equivalents in 1998). This
comment's author speculates that this doctrinal development rendered at least marginally more
difficult the JPO examiners' task of evaluating infringement in response to a Hantei request.
Prior to the recognition of the doctrine of equivalents by the courts, unless the JPO unilaterally
aspired to be more thorough, the minimum required of the examiners to make a functional
Hantei rendition that would mirror a subsequent judicial analysis was to superficially inspect the
claims of the questioned patents for literal infringement. However, after Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), the author also speculates that PTO examiners
conducting Hantei investigations would not have to do much more.
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procedures have been extra-judicially phased out by the 2003207
amendment in the Patent Law.20 8
Another limiting factor may be the traditionally small awards
prescribed by the courts where infringement is found.20 9 Japan has not
adopted a system of trial by jury in civil actions,2 ° and judge-ordered
awards are, in theory, less susceptible to sympathetic augmentations
than amounts determined by plaintiff-favoring juries. Moreover, due
to the formulaic use of damage-calculation schemes by Japanese
courts, coupled with the lack of statute-granted punitive damages,21'
the resulting awards are often small in comparison to those given in
the U.S.2 12 In addition, under a provision in Japanese Patent Law §
102 that survived the 1998 amendment, courts have discretion to
"limit damages to an amount equal to a reasonable royalty, even if
actual damages were higher."
213
While predictability and uniformity are normally associated with
a healthy judicial system, in Japan they are arguably open to
exploitation. The courts' clockwork reliance on the damages
calculation formula and high uniformity of adjudication in Japan's
national legal system 214 allows would-be litigants to accurately predict
the award amount and settle before trial accordingly.215 This is a
mixed blessing. Granted, the parties may be better able to assess the
costs and benefits of undertaking litigation if they can presage the
207. In the fifteenth year of the Heisei reign by the Japanese calendar.
208. See Japan Patent Attorneys Association, 2003 Amendment to Japan Patent Law,
http://wwwjpaa.or.jp/english/law/ 2003amendment.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
209. See, e.g., Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 258 (noting that the patent
infringement awards made by Japanese courts in 1990 through 1994 were "abysmal" and "less
than 1% of the U.S. annual average ... over the same period.").
210. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 125.
211. See id.
212. For instance, from 1990 through 1994, Japanese awards amounted to less than 1% of
the U.S. annual average in the same period. See Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 258
(Approximately $415,000 compared to $92 million). Also, in 1996, it appears that the average
reasonable royalty rate set by U.S. courts was 11,% compared to 4.2% as awarded by the
Japanese courts. Takenaka, supra note 12, at 337.
213. Id. at 321 (contending that the Japanese legislature was "more concerned about
protecting innocent infringers than about protecting patentees.").
214. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 126.
215. This is the rationalist paradigm used to explain why the Japanese might be less rights
conscious than their U.S. counterparts. See PORT, supra note 123, at 8:
The would-be Japanese litigant fully understands the likely litigated outcome and
chooses to settle confident that he/she would not fare substantially better if he/she
litigated the case to judgment .... To the rationalist, . . . the Japanese simply
know their system too well and settle fully compensated rather than waste their
time and energy suing.
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outcome, but there is an immediate and adverse side-effect - for the
cases where the award of reasonable royalties will be less than the
damages, the defendant has less incentive to deal in good faith. He
could rationally infringe and risk litigation in the hopes of a favorable
finding. The worst-case scenario is that he pays what he would have
paid had he licensed from the outset. Given the circumstances and the
state of the law, "[i]t's stupid not to steal."21 6
It appears that Japan already has a reliable predetermination
method of liability independent of Hantei. It just happens to be overly
reliable 21 7 and not predisposed to opening a dialogue where Hantei
evidence would be an effective bargaining chip. Compared to
Japanese parties, U.S. parties would probably prefer to have the
technical Hantei opinion at their disposal before going into the
arbitrator's conference room.
In light of the infrequency of findings of infringement, habitually
diminutive award sizes, and exploited predictability, litigation in
Japan is less attractive to patentee-plaintiffs2 t 8 and less deterring of
infringing defendants.
B. Customizing the Solution
The Hantei Request System need not be imported clause for
clause. Application of the system should be tailored towards the
demands of the public and the capacity of the PTO to supply the
services. Several improvements to the current Hantei Request System
should be considered in light of these concerns.
First, among the three examiners who are chosen, the PTO
should require where possible that there be at least one examiner who
has previously handled the office actions of any of the patents under
scrutiny. This extra step would ensure that the examiners most
familiar with handling the patents are actively participating in
debating the technical scope of each patent. Any potential bias by an
examiner for the patent issued on his watch will be balanced out by
that of the examiner who issued the other patent. The PTO may even
reduce the number of examiners to just two, one for each patent to be
compared in the Hantei request.
216. Yamamoto & Tessensohn, supra note 17, at 258.
217. See PORT, supra note 123, at 8.
218. It is worth pointing out that all of these enumerated factors may be indicative not of a
well-functioning legal machine, but of the opposite premise, that the Japanese system is in
actually broken and therefore under-utilized. Cf PORT, supra note 123, at 7-8 (discussing a
revisionist view of why litigation is little resorted to in Japan). The two explanatory paradigms,
revisionist and rationalist, appear to be mutually consistent.
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There need not even be a second patent.2" 9 The comparison may
be between an active patent and the proposed or current activity of a
non-patent holder. This would, in effect, be a more affordable,
reliable, neutral, and authoritative version of the diligence opinion,
while accomplishing the same baseline purpose of the opinion, viz. to
show non-willfulness.
In case the use of Hantei would supplant that of diligence
opinions, the PTO might be concerned with the flood of requests that
would overwhelm the office's resources. In this contingency, a joint
effort, not unlike the current Patent Prosecution Highway between the
JPO and the PTO, could expediently dispel this fear. Whereas the
Patent Prosecution Highway pilot program is geared towards
reciprocally delegating the examination of the eligibility of patent
applications, here the sister program 220  would be devoted to
interpreting the scope of claims. In order not to sacrifice the
advantages of having the patent examiners most familiar with the
patents debating them together,221 the PTO examiners would have to
be retained, but the third examiner, if there is one, might be a JPO
examiner. In the alternative, if this "Hantei Highway" is implemented
only after the Patent Prosecution Highway has become regular
practice, then we can expect that one or both Hantei requesters to the
PTO were applicants whose patent applications were also forwarded
to PO examiners. Thus, the Hantei request to the PTO would be
handled by one or more of the original JPO examiners, reducing the
burden on the PTO's resources in those cases. In short, volume
control of the "Hantei Highway" traffic may depend on the continued
success and utilization of the Patent Prosecution Highway.
Also, institutionalized use of Hantei would have the net effect of
accelerating the completion of invalidation proceedings. If, in
rendering the non-binding opinion on actual infringement, the
examiners took note of a particularly weak patent, the Hantei might
219. Though ideally the examiners might want to have two familiar patents before them to
contrast the scope of the claims of each patent, the Hantei requester need not be a patent holder.
He may be a Vladimir, a prospective investor, a current applicant awaiting approval, a cautious
businessman who is not tech-savvy, a concerned member of the public, or a diffident inventor
who is curious to know if his latest invention has successfully been designed around a prior
patent and is worth applying for a patent. Alternately, the Hantei requester may be an Estragon
who wishes to gauge the chances of litigation success against a potential infringer that is
operating without any patent of their own.
220. For ease of reference, we might call it the "Hantei Highway."
221. Cf. 2 MPEP, supra note 8, § 2236(I) (the supervisory examiner of the art unit "will
assign the reexamination request to an examiner different from the examiner(s) who examined
the patent application.").
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be used in a subsequent invalidation proceeding to sift out
questionable or duplicative patent claims.
In conclusion, there is no procedural, functional, institutional or
economic reason why the U.S. could not synergistically use a Hantei-
like system to its advantage, giving the public more choices and tools
to consider using during either litigation, pre-litigation, or ADR.222
C. Overcoming Potential Drawbacks
Even without divesting the court of its power to evaluate the
scope of patent claims, assignment of the same task to the PTO may
raise a variety of constitutional implications and doubts. First, is the
delegation of power to an administrative agency constitutionally
permissible? 223 According to Professor Duffy's detailed analysis of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, administrative assistance does not
appear to be problematic.22 4
Second, there is a potential separation of powers issue between
the executive and the judicial branches of the government.22 5 As long
as the opinion on the scope is advisory, however, then courts still
222. The synergy is amplified by the particularities of the economic and structural make-
up of the U.S. IP market, which is better situated to appreciate the advantages of Hantei than the
Japanese public composite. Interview with Osamu Koike, Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd., Intellectual
Property Legal Division, Counsel, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 6, 2006) ("In my opinion, Hantei is
more favorable for small entities such as individual inventors or venture companies rather than
established big companies.... In this regard, Hantei would be more suitable to US; there are
more individual inventors, small venture companies, and patent-licensing entities.").
223. See Someno & Someno, supra note 57, at 111 (noting that Japan has a constitutional
restriction on its administrative agencies, prohibiting them from acting as "tribunals of last
resort."); KENPO [JAPANESE CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 2. Note, however, that Japan has
managed to constitutionally permit and provide Hantei service. Might the PTO be able to do so
under the U.S. Constitution as well?
224. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 136-42, 165 (speculating from how flexibly and broadly
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, which allows a trial court to obtain an advisory opinion from a
centralized, expert administrative agency, is applied in other areas of U.S. law that there should
similarly be no constitutional barrier to its application in patent law). But more convincing is an
already extant, working example of reliance upon an administrative organ. The International
Trade Commission has jurisdiction over a certain subset of patent disputes, and administrative
law judges may order injunctions against infringers. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d),
(e), (f), (g), and (i) (2000).
225. The Chevron doctrine is probably not implicated, because the PTO has not been
charged with interpreting or administering the Patent Act in regard to infringement. Thus, even
if there were any ambiguity with 35 U.S.C. § 271, Chevron's two-step inquiry would not lead to
the conclusion that any judicial deference is owed to the agency's determination of infringement
or non-infringement. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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have the last word.2 26 As such, the power of the executive branch is
kept in check in case of its abuse.
Last, there may be concerns about depriving litigants of the right
to trial by jury, preserved by the Seventh Amendment. 227 Strict
reliance by the court on PTO's Hantei evidence at face value may
deprive the defendant in an infringement suit of his right to be tried
before a panel of peers. In light of this concern, the import of Hantei
evidence may, as a concession, be diluted to afford the same weight
as any other piece of evidence for the jury to consider in the totality of
circumstances. Ideally, however, the jury should be instructed to
afford it great weight, if possible up to the point of being clear and
convincing evidence of infringement or non-infringement, so long as
this construct remains within constitutional bounds.
This argument assumes that the Seventh Amendment preserves a
right to trial by jury in a patent dispute. It has been accepted in U.S.
common law and traditionally practiced since 1791 in England that a
jury determines infringement as a matter of fact. 228 The concern is that
if Hantei evidence is used defensively by Vladimir and accepted by
the court as conclusive evidence, perhaps Estragon would be deprived
of his right persisting since the 18th century forwards to have his
claims tried before a jury, so long as he remembers to invoke it.229
The indulgence of the historical analogy inquiry in Markman
230
may have laid the question of whether litigants have the right to a trial
by jury in patent disputes to rest, and to resurrect a contention to the
contrary may seem outrageous, but perhaps the issue merits a second
look. In his concurring opinion in Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers
Local 391 v. Terry,231 Justice Brennan urged the Court to discard its
226. See Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-52 (1932) (noting that in cases of "equity
and admiralty" the courts historically could sua sponte call upon neutral third parties, such as
administrative agents, to assist it in making factual determinations, and that while the "reports of
masters and commissioners ... are essentially of an advisory nature, it has not been the practice
to disturb their findings ... and the parties have no right to demand that the court shall
redetermine the facts thus found.").
227. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
228. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-77 (1996).
229. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
230. See Marlanan, 517 U.S. at 376-84 (concluding that even though "there is no dispute
that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury ..... evidence of common-law practice at
the time of the framing does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment's jury guarantee
to the construction of the claim document .... ).
231. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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historical inquiry as irrelevant because the nature of the remedy was
the dispositive factor. 232 His observation was unsurprising in light of
how the Court and the dissenting Justices, despite utilizing the same
historical inquiry, came to opposite conclusions, each corresponding
to the difference of opinion on how the nature of the remedy was
construed.2 33
It follows then that where the nature of the sought remedy in a
patent dispute is not monetary, a court, relying on either the majority
or the dissent's traditional two-step 234 analysis or Justice Brennan's
shortcut, may conclude that the relief sought is equitable.23 5
Therefore, in proceedings where the plaintiff is solely seeking an
injunction or invalidation, the reasons for supporting the right to a
jury trial are not animated. A greater or even conclusive reliance on
PTO-adduced evidence in these cases by the courts may be less
intrusive upon constitutional rights than in other cases.
In addition, in an invalidation proceeding against Estragon's
patent, Estragon's interests might be more pronounced and likely to
be trampled upon than they would be after an unfavorable ruling of
non-infringement. By comparison, his interests are not hurt as much
because he would still retain his patent rights in the latter scenario. If,
however, absent the Hantei evidence, he would have won on the
infringement claim, there is then still the danger of a potentially
substantial divestment of Estragon's property right.
The final inquiry, then, goes to determining the net worth of the
talismanic requesting of Hantei by the judicial system on a regular
basis and affording it either clear and convincing or conclusive
weight. The courts' procedural gains must be balanced against the
litigants' property interests in observance of the minimum
requirements of due process.23 6 The court would engage in this
analysis by first estimating how often the inclusion of Hantei
232. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring) ("However, this Court, in expounding the test, has
repeatedly discounted the significance of the analogous form of action for deciding where the
Seventh Amendment applies. I think it is time we dispense with it altogether.").
233. See id. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Having made this decision in favor of an
equitable action, our inquiry should end.").
234. See id. at 565 ("To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, we
examine both the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought.").
235. In U.S. patent law, the statutory remedies available to a patentee include injunctive
and monetary relief, as authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) and (C) (2000), and attorneys
fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
236. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
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evidence would be outcome determinative,237  multiplying this
probability by the average cost to the unfairly treated litigant, and
then juxtaposing this multiplicand2 38 against the government's interest
in achieving better overall judicial efficiency and executive ease. 239
VIII.CONCLUSION
Current methods of patent dispute resolution in the U.S. do not
readily offer the user authoritative, neutral, and reliable guidance
allowing him to best modify his business behavior in order to avoid
liability. Means of procuring such valuable instruction are
encumbered by impractical burdens and conditioned upon self-
defeating concessions. The high visibility and accountability of
conduct, the perceived certainty of retaliation, the automaticity of
heavy-impact consequences, and the seemingly confrontational nature
of even innocent probing effectively foreclose risk-adverse innovators
from choosing a safe path on which to pursue prospects while
protecting their investments.2 40  This high-stakes, high-risk
environment is not conducive to effective handling of patent disputes,
chilling, rather than encouraging, industries to innovate "[s]cience and
useful [a]rts" 24'
A Hantei Request System will introduce a new, sensible, and
attractive option of petitioning an administrative organ for a non-
binding technical ruling on the scope of an adversary's patent. It will
provide prospective private parties with better, faster, and more
highly accessible information that can be critical in determining the
strength of their positions and the relative worth of their assets,
237. This represents the likelihood of producing false positives and false negatives in suits
between the Estragons and Vladimirs of the world.
238. This represents the overall gravity of deprivation and unfairness to the party who
would have won but for the summary adjudication on the conclusive weight of an inaccurate
technical opinion.
239. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) ("The extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he
may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' and depends upon whether the recipient's interest
in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.") (citation
omitted).
240. The latter concerns likewise discourage risk-adverse patentees from questioning
potentially infringing practices.
241. This is discordant with the spirit of the constitutional mandate to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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without exposing the availing parties to the subsequent risk of
litigation, harassment, or blacklisting.242
Additionally, judicial reliance on the procedure will usher in
many intangible benefits that will enhance the internal machinery of
national patent dispute resolution. Moreover, there is no procedural,
institutional, economic, or constitutional barrier to prevent the U.S.
federal courts or the PTO from synergistically utilizing the Hantei
Request System to their advantage, giving large and small entities
more options to consider before litigation, during litigation, or
without litigation via ADR.
Therefore, a Hantei-like Request procedure, customized to
reflect the demands of the public and the facility of the government,
should be adopted.
242. Calling upon the ITC is another administrative means of construing claims, but it
cannot promise the anonymity of a Hantei Request. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§
1337(d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) (2000).
